




The Dissertation Committee for Feng Pan
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Stochastic Network Interdiction: Models and Methods
Committee:
David P. Morton, Supervisor




Stochastic Network Interdiction: Models and Methods
by
Feng Pan, B.S., M.A.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY




First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor David
Morton for his guidance and support. He introduced stochastic programming
to me and provided me a positive and active research environment. I will
miss the ”Friday Morning” seminars. His knowledge, enthusiasm and insight
have been truly invaluable. More personally, his encouragement and advice
are vital in completing my dissertation.
I would like to thank my co-advisor, Professor Bill Charlton. He intro-
duced me to the field of nonproliferation and to many exciting works in Los
Alamos National Laboratory.
I thank my dissertation committee members, Prof. Jonathan Bard,
Prof. Paul Jensen, and Prof. Elmira Popova for evaluating my dissertation and
providing suggestions for its improvement. Especially, Prof. Popova advised
me and supported me financially at the beginning of my program. I thank
Prof. Crawford for encouraging me to pursuit a Ph.D. degree in operations
research.
I would like to thank D-4 group and Second Line of Defense program
office in Los Alamos National Laboratory for supporting my research. Espe-
cially, D-4 group management provided me a positive working environment
where I was able to conduct my research. I want to thank Kevin Saeger for
v
his support and discussion on many different and interesting applications in
operations research.
I would like thank my friends, Guzin for interesting chatting of many
different topics, Yong for answering my endless questions about CPLEX and
Linux, and Anukal for discussion on stochastic programming and life in general.
I want to thank my parents for their patient and support. Finally, this
work would not have been possible without the constant love and support from
my wife, Mika.
vi
Stochastic Network Interdiction: Models and Methods
Publication No.
Feng Pan, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2005
Supervisors: David P. Morton
William S. Charlton
We develop stochastic network interdiction models and associated solution
methods. In its simplest form, our model consists of a smuggler who wishes
to traverse a network from an origin to a destination without being detected.
Probabilities associated with the indigenous transportation network specify
likelihoods that a smuggler can traverse each arc in the network undetected. By
installing a detector on an arc we can decrease that probability. The decision-
making problem is to select arcs to receive detectors subject to budget and pol-
icy constraints. The goal is to minimize the probability that a smuggler evades
detection when the smuggler’s origin-destination pair is known only through a
probability distribution. The model has two stages: first we install detectors
then the random origin-destination pair of the smuggler is revealed and the
smuggler selects a maximum-reliability path knowing detector locations and
detection probabilities. When we consider that detectors can only be installed
on the “boundary” of the network, we show that the model can be reduced
vii
to an interdiction problem on a simpler bipartite network. In other variants
of the model, the smuggler has partial information on detector locations and
may have a different perception (than the interdictor) of the detection proba-
bilities. These models are cast as stochastic mixed-integer programs, and the
complexity of the models is investigated. Our solution procedure includes sce-
nario reduction, other preprocessing techniques and decomposition methods,
all exploiting special structures in our stochastic network interdiction prob-
lems. We further enhance our solution procedures by developing a class of
valid inequalities to tighten the integer-programming formulation.
This work is motivated by the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program,
a cooperative effort between the US Department of Energy and the Russian
Federation State Customs Committee. SLD’s primary goal is to minimize the
risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and technologies through detection
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“Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov routed an FSK (Federal-
naya Sluzhba Konterrazvedki) report . . . the plutonium smuggled into Munich
in August 1994 was stolen and then sold by four Russian citizens in Obninsk
. . .”
– OMRI Daily Digest entry, 13 February 1996
“On 16 March 1997, 10 ‘containers of radioactive material’ were stolen
from an arms factory located in Fier, Albania, . . .”
– The Times, 21 March 1997, by Richard Owen
“The Ukrainian Main Directorate for Fighting Organized Crime de-
tained a suspect attempting to transport a container holding 400g of radioac-
tive material across the Ukrainian-Hungarian border on 24 February 2004,
. . .”
– Interfax-Ukraine, 26 February 2004
Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, equipment and technology poses
an imminent threat to global security and world peace. The US government
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and much of the world community continually attempt to prevent the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction. In this dissertation we develop and
solve mathematical programming models known as a stochastic network in-
terdiction models, that are designed to decrease the likelihood that nuclear
material can be smuggled across international borders.
Interdiction is the act of confronting and halting an activity. Inter-
diction models can provide tactics and strategies to thwart the activities of
an adversary operating in some system. Network interdiction models are ap-
propriate when the system in question can be modeled by a network. Net-
work interdiction models typically involve the allocation of scarce resources
to degrade the performance of an adversary whose behavior is modeled via a
network optimization problem. Such models have application in the military,
national security, law enforcement, computer security, business planning, and
disease control.
The study of network interdiction models in operations research be-
gan in the 1970s. During the Vietnam War, McMasters and Mustin [40] and
Ghare et al [27] developed deterministic mathematical programs to disrupt
flow of enemy troops and materiel. The problem of maximizing an adver-
sary’s shortest path is considered in [26] and [28]. A closely related problem
concerns maximizing the longest path in an adversary’s PERT network [51].
The above models are solved as linear programs, and the interdictor can con-
tinuously increase the length of an arc, subject to a budget constraint. A
discrete version of maximizing the shortest path removes an interdicted arc
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from the network, and when the budget constraint is simply a cardinality con-
straint, this is known as the k-most-vital arcs problem [20, 38]. The related
decision problem is strongly NP-Complete [8, 13]. Generalizations of the k-
most-vital arcs problem, and associated solution procedures, are considered
in [33]. Wollmer [61] developed an algorithm for minimizing the maximum
flow by removing arcs from a network. Wood [64] used integer programming
to formulate the interdiction problem of removing arcs to minimize flow in
an adversary’s maximum-flow network and showed the (decision) problem to
be strongly NP-Complete. See [59] for game-theoretic approaches to related
network interdiction problems, [19] for an interdiction model on a minimum-
cost-flow network, and [2] for an interdiction model for cost effective control of
nosocomial infections in hospitals. Often, uncertainty is associated with the
underlying network or the effectiveness of interdiction attempts. For instance,
arc capacities, arc length, and even the topology of a network may be known
only through a probability distribution. Also, the success of an interdiction
attempt, e.g., increasing an arc’s length, or decreasing an arc’s capacity, can
be modeled in a probabilistic manner. In [21], the work of [64] on interdict-
ing a maximum-flow network is generalized to allow for random arc capacities
and random interdiction successes. In these models, the interdictor does not
know whether an interdiction attempt will successfully remove an arc and the
interdictor does not know the true capacity of some arcs. However, the adver-
sary knows the realizations of these random variables and maximizes flow in
the residual network. The interdictor’s goal is to minimize the expected value
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of this maximum flow. This problem is modeled as a two-stage stochastic
program. Hemmecke et al. [31] developed models to interdict the minimum
path while the underlying network topology is uncertain. For more on network
interdiction problems, see the collection of papers in the recent book [63].
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, we briefly review mixed-integer programming
and stochastic programming. The emphasis is on topics relevant to this dis-
sertation.
1.2 Mixed-integer Programming
Among early applications of integer programming, Dantzig, Fulkerson
and Johnson [23] solved a 49-city traveling salesman problem by using a combi-
nation of the simplex method and cutting planes. In 1960, Land and Doig [37]
presented a branch-and-bound algorithm for integer programming. Branch-
and-bound algorithms rely on being able to solve a large number of linear pro-
gramming (LP) problems within a reasonable amount of time. Branch-and-cut
methods [22, 32, 45, 46] improve the effectiveness of branch-and-bound meth-
ods by adding cutting planes in the course of the branch-and-bound method.
Since the 1950s, along with advances in column-generation methods, branch-
and-price algorithms have become an effective method and remain an active
research area [11, 12, 25, 34, 55, 57]. In a branch-and-price method, we can
tighten an integer program’s LP relaxation by a reformulation that involves a
huge number of variables.
In the last paragraph we mentioned three major LP-based solution
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methods for integer programming. All these methods repeatedly solve LP
relaxations, and the quality of the LP relaxation directly effects the meth-
ods. With respect to quality, it is ideal to have the feasible region of the
LP relaxation coincide with the convex hull of the integer program’s feasi-
ble region, at least in the neighborhood of the optimal solution. In branch-
and-cut algorithms, cutting planes are added to restrict the feasible region
of the LP relaxation. In 1958 Gomory [29, 30] proposed fractional cuts and
proved that an associated cutting-plane algorithm converges finitely. Although
these structure-independent cutting planes are valid for general integer pro-
grams, the algorithm, by itself, is not competitive with branch-and-bound
schemes. In the 1990s, lift-and-project techniques [4, 5] were used to im-
prove the performance of structure-independent cutting planes in the context
of branch-and-bound methods. Structure-dependent cutting planes have been
used in a variety of specially-structured problems, including knapsack prob-
lems [6, 22, 48, 60], vertex packing [3, 42, 43, 47], and the traveling salesman
problem [7, 14, 46]. These structure-dependent cutting planes often prove to
be enormously helpful, from a computational perspective.
The solution methods we discussed above can be applied to mixed-
integer programming (MIP). In this dissertation, cutting-plane methods are a
key solution method, and we introduce some relevant definitions in the rest of
this section (see [62] for details). Cutting planes are essential in tightening LP
relaxations. We also want to make sure that by adding inequalities, we don’t
eliminate any integer feasible solutions. Let X ⊆ Rn be a polyhedron.
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Definition 1.2.1. An inequality πx ≤ π0 is a valid inequality for the polyhe-
dron X if πx ≤ π0 for all x ∈ X
In the content of MIP, X can be the convex hull of the feasible region
of a mixed-integer linear program. Valid inequalities are added to eliminate
some feasible fractional solutions of the LP relaxation while keeping all integral
feasible solutions of the mixed-integer linear program intact.
There can be infinitely many valid inequalities for a given polyhedron,
so we seek a theoretical measure of the “quality” of a valid inequality.
Definition 1.2.2. If πx ≤ π0 and µx ≤ µ0 are both valid inequalities for the
polyhedron X ⊆ Rn+, πx ≤ π0 dominates µx ≤ µ0 if there exists a scalar u > 0
such that π ≥ uµ and π0 ≤ uµ0, and (π, π0) = (uµ, uµ0).
A valid inequality becomes redundant to the description of the convex
hull of a mixed-integer linear program’s feasible region if it is dominated by
other valid inequalities.
Definition 1.2.3. For a valid inequality πx ≤ π0 of the polyhedron X, F
is a face of X if F = {x ∈ X : πx = π0} = ∅; a face becomes a facet if
dim(F ) = dim(X) − 1.
Facets are strong valid inequalities for a polyhedron X, and they are
necessary for the description of X, at least when representing it as an intersec-
tion of half spaces. Thus, when a facet is removed, the resulting polyhedron
differs from the original one.
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For an NP-Complete MIP problem, it is impossible to obtain the ex-
plicit description of the convex hull of the mixed-integer linear program’s fea-
sible region in polynomial time unless NP = P . However, by adding valid
inequalities, the convex hulls of a mixed-integer linear program and its LP
relaxation in the neighborhood of optimal solution can become closer, and
the gap between the objective values of the mixed-integer linear program and
its LP relaxation can decrease. However, adding a large number of valid in-
equalities typically increases the computational effort required to solve the
LP relaxation. Thus, identifying facets becomes important. One approach
to show that a valid inequality defines a facet of the polyhedron X is to find
dim(X) affinely independent points of X at which the valid inequality holds
with equality.
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on the branch-and-bound and
cutting-plane methods to solve our MIP problems. For other solution tech-
niques, see [39, 44, 62].
1.3 Stochastic Programming
Stochastic programming (SP) deals with decision making under cer-
tainty. In contrast to deterministic optimization, model parameters are not
known with certainty but rather via probability distributions. Stochastic pro-
gramming can be viewed as generalizing deterministic mathematical program-
ming. There are several different classes of stochastic programming models
[18, 35, 50], and in this dissertation, we concentrate on integer programming
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variants of the following two-stage stochastic linear program with recourse
min
x
cx + E[h(x, ξ)]




h(x, ξω) = min
y
fωy
s.t. Dωy = dω − Bωx
y ≥ 0.
(1.2)
We call (1.2) the second-stage problem and E[h(x, ξ)] the recourse function.
Here, ξ is a random vector consisting of the random elements of D, B, f and d,
and ξω, ω ∈ Ω, denotes a realization of ξ. Timing is a key issue in SP: a here-
and-now decision x is made first, then a scenario ξω, ω ∈ Ω, is realized, and a
recourse action y is taken. In contrast to other areas of stochastic optimiza-
tion, such as statistical decision theory, Markov decision processes, stochastic
dynamic programming, and stochastic control, stochastic programming is a
branch of mathematical programming, and so it inherits a rich class of models
and solution techniques. See the textbooks [18, 35, 50] for detailed introduc-
tions to stochastic programming. The two-stage stochastic linear program was
introduced by Dantzig [24] and Beale [15]. Broadly speaking, there are three
categories of solution methods for such problems. A stochastic program with
a finite number of scenarios can be transformed into an equivalent large-scale,
but deterministic, optimization problem, and solution techniques from large-
scale optimization can be applied, including decomposition-based methods,
such as the L-shaped method [58], its variants [17, 54], and Lagrangian meth-
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ods [52, 53]. Deterministic approximation methods are used to deal with the
difficulty of high-dimensional integration, typically by reducing the number of
scenarios and iteratively improving the upper and lower bounds on the optimal
value of the original problem. For stochastic programs with a large number
of scenarios and involving many dimensions, Monte Carlo simulation is widely
regarded as the method of choice.
In this dissertation, we use the L-shaped method, which is closely re-
lated to Benders decomposition from mixed-integer linear programming and
Kelley’s cutting-plane method from nonlinear programming, to solve our stochas-
tic programs. The second-stage problem, (1.2), is a parametric optimization
problem in x and ξω. When D is deterministic, we say (1.2) has fixed re-
course. For any feasible first stage decision variable x, if the second-stage
problem (1.2) is feasible for all ω ∈ Ω then we say the problem has relatively
complete recourse.
Theorem 1.3.1. Assume that the second-stage problem (1.2) has fixed and
relatively complete recourse and X = {x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0} then
1. if ξ = (d, B) then h(x, ·) is piecewise linear and convex on the convex
hull of ξ’s support provided x ∈ X.
2. if ξ = (f) then h(x, ·) is piecewise linear and concave on the convex hull
of ξ’s support provided x ∈ X;
3. h(·, ξω) is piecewise linear and convex on X.
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Under a discrete probability distribution in which pω denotes the prob-







s.t. Ax = b
θω ≥ h(x, ξω) ∀ω ∈ Ω.
(1.3)
The dual of the second-stage problem (1.2) is
h(x, ξω) = max
π
π(dω − Bωx)
s.t. πD ≤ fω, (1.4)
and we call (1.4) the subproblem. In this dissertation, we assume that the
optimal value of (1.2) is finite for all x satisfying the constraints of (1.1) and
all scenario ω. We can express (1.4) as follows
h(x, ξω) = max
i∈{1,2,··· ,Lω}
πω,i(dω − Bωx),
where πω,1, · · · , πω,Lω are the extreme points of the second-stage dual feasible
region {π : πD ≤ fω}. Let gω,i = πω,idω and Gω,i = πω,iBω. We call
θω ≥ gω,i − Gω,ix (1.5)
an optimality cut. Explicitly expressing h(x, ξω) in term of optimality cuts,







s.t. Ax = b
θω ≥ gω,i − Gω,ix, i = 1, · · · , Lω, ω ∈ Ω,
(1.6)
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which is the full master program because it contains all optimality cuts for
each scenario. The number of scenarios and the number of extreme points of
{π : πD ≤ fω} can make the full master program very large. So, we start







s.t. Ax = b
θω ≥ gω,i − Gω,ix, i = 1, · · · , lω, ω ∈ Ω,
(1.7)
where only subsets of optimality cuts are included for each ω ∈ Ω when lω <
Lω. Since we may not need all the optimality cuts to find an optimal solution,
we may obtain an optimal solution from a relaxed master program which is
much smaller than the full master program A multi-cut version of the L-shaped
algorithm is described as following.
Multi-cut L-shaped Algorithm
Step 0 Define the tolerance ε ≥ 0. Set z̄ = ∞ and z = −M . Initialize the
set of cuts with θω ≥ −M , ω ∈ Ω.
Step 1 Solve the relaxed master problem (1.7). Obtain the optimal solution




Step 2 For ω ∈ Ω, solve subproblem (1.4) with x = x̂ and obtain the primal
and dual optimal solution (ŷω, π̂ω). Let ẑ = cx̂ +
∑
ω∈Ω
pωfωŷω. If ẑ < z̄,
then put z̄ = ẑ and x∗ = x̂.
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Step 3 If z̄ − z ≤ ε min(|z̄|, |z|), then stop: x∗ is a solution with an objective
function value within (100ε)% of optimal.
Step 4 For ω ∈ Ω, if θ̂ω < π̂ω(dω − Bωx̂), let lω = lω + 1 and add
θω ≥ π̂ωdω − π̂ωBωx
to the relaxed master problem (1.7). Go to Step 1.
We call this procedure the multi-cut L-shaped algorithm because during each
iteration, it possibly generates an optimality cut for each scenario. The multi-
cut L-shaped algorithm provides better resolution of the approximation of the
recourse function, and it is expected to require fewer iterations of solving the
master problem. If the master problem is a mixed-integer linear program,
reducing the number of times we must solve it can reduce the overall compu-
tational effort. For more detailed discussions on solutions methods for SP, see
[18, 35, 50].
1.4 Overview of the Contents
In this dissertation, we introduce new stochastic network interdiction
models and develop associated solution methods. Chapter 2 develops our
basic stochastic network interdiction model in which the evader’s maximum-
reliability path and the associated evasion probability are calculated under the
assumption that the evader knows the detector locations and the detection
probabilities. Variants of this basic interdiction model are developed under
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different assumptions that the smuggler has partial information on detector
locations or different perceptions (than the interdictor) of detection probabil-
ities. We also consider a special case in which all interdictions can be only
made on the border of a country, and in this case the basic interdiction model
reduces to a stochastic bipartite network interdiction problem. Complexity of
these interdiction models is also discussed.
Chapter 3 concentrates on solving the stochastic bipartite network in-
terdiction problem. We consider the model in its deterministic equivalent form,
which is a mixed-integer linear program. Coefficient reduction and other pre-
processing techniques are used to reduce the model size and valid inequalities
are introduced to strengthen the model’s LP relaxation. We provide structural
properties for the bipartite model, we introduce a class of valid inequalities,
and we give computational results for our solution techniques.
Chapter 4 discusses solution methods for the basic stochastic network
interdiction model on a general network. Preprocessing is used to improve the
original formulation. We develop a solution method combining the multi-cut
L-shaped algorithm and an extension of the valid inequality from Chapter 3 to
solve this stochastic network interdiction problem. Local search and associated
optimality cuts are used to improve the performance of the multi-cut L-shaped
algorithm. Computational results are discussed.
Chapter 5 gives conclusions on our stochastic network interdiction mod-




Stochastic Network Interdiction Models
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, we reviewed network interdiction models and their appli-
cations. A network interdiction problem can be viewed as a bi-level optimiza-
tion problem (e.g., [10, 56]) with the higher level being a resource allocation
problem and the lower level being a network flow problem. In contrast to
the interdiction models described in Chapter 1, the objective of our model
is to minimize the probability of a successful smuggling attempt through a
transportation network, where the smuggler is assumed to choose a maximum-
reliability path at the lower level. This model may be appropriate when the
consequence of a successful smuggling attempt could be catastrophic (e.g.,
smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction). In these cases, it is important to
reduce the probability of a successful smuggling rather than minimizing the
volume of smuggled material, or maximizing the time and cost of a smuggling
attempt.
Our motivation comes from the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program,
which is a cooperative effort between the US Department of Energy and the
Russian Federation State Customs Committee. The objective of SLD is to
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reduce the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear material and technology through
detection and deterrence by enhancing detection capabilities at border cross-
ings. Consider a smuggler who obtains weapons-grade nuclear material from a
facility in Russia and then tries to reach a final destination outside of Russia.
Without nuclear material detectors, the smuggler may be caught by the police
or other law enforcement through random or routine checks at road blocks or
customs sites. By installing detectors at customs sites, the chance of detecting
the smuggler is improved. Due to resource limitations, the question then be-
comes at which customs sites equipment should be deployed to maximize the
detection probability.
We model two adversaries, an interdictor and an evader (also called a
smuggler), and an underlying network G(N, A) on which the evader travels. In
the deterministic version of the model, the evader starts at a specified source
node s ∈ N and wishes to reach a specified terminal node t ∈ N . The model
is deterministic in that this origin-destination pair is known. If the interdictor
has not installed a sensor on arc (i, j) ∈ A, then the probability that the
evader can traverse (i, j) undetected is pij, and this probability is qij < pij
if the interdictor has installed a detector on (i, j). (We use the terms sensor
and detector interchangeably.) The events of the evader being detected on
distinct arcs are assumed to be mutually independent. The evader chooses a
path from s to t so as to maximize the probability of traversing the network
without being detected. With limited resources, the interdictor must select
arcs on which to install detectors in order to minimize the probability the
15
evader travels from s to t undetected. The evader’s optimization problem is
known as the maximum-reliability path problem and, even though there are
probability values on the arcs (pij’s and qij’s), this problem can be solved as
a deterministic shortest-path problem (e.g., exercise 4.39 of [1]).
Our stochastic network interdiction model differs from the above de-
scription only in that the (s, t) pair for the evader is unknown when the inter-
dictor must select sites for installing sensors. However, the origin-destination
pair (s, t) is assumed to be governed by a known probability mass function,
pω = P{(s, t) = (sω, tω)}, ω ∈ Ω. The interdictor’s goal is to minimize the
probability that the evader traverses the network undetected, i.e., the objec-
tive function is a sum of (conditional) evasion probabilities, each weighted
by pω, over all possible origin-destination pairs. The timing of decisions and
realizations is key in this interdiction problem. First, the interdictor installs
sensors. Then, a random origin-destination pair for the evader is revealed
and the evader selects an sω–tω path to maximize the probability of avoid-
ing detection. The evader selects this path with knowledge of the locations
of the detectors and the evasion probabilities pij and qij, respectively, for all
(i, j) ∈ A. An evader can be caught by indigenous law enforcement without
detection equipment and so pij < 1. To date, nuclear smuggling attempts that
have been stopped have been by this means.
The values of pij and qij are important parameters in our model. How
do we estimate these values? Also, does an evader always travel on a maximum-
reliability path? More generally, how does an evader behave? These questions
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are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
In Section 2.2, we introduce further notation and make our modeling
assumptions precise. In Section 2.3 we describe our basic stochastic network
interdiction problem (SNIP). In SNIP, we assume that an informed evader
knows the location of detectors and has the same perception of pij and qij as
the interdictor does. Our model is a two-stage program, using a “min-max”
structure because the interdictor is minimizing the evader’s maximum evasion
probability. We then develop an equivalent two-stage stochastic Linear mixed-
integer program. The need for the MIP formulation is justified by the fact
that SNIP or, more precisely, the related decision problem, SNIP-Decision,
is strongly NP-Complete (Section 2.8). In Section 2.4, the U-SNIP model for
an uninformed evader is derived, and Section 2.5 gives a hybrid model with
a mixed population of informed and uninformed evaders. In Section 2.7, we
consider an important special case of SNIP that arose in our SLD work in
which sensors can only be installed at border crossings of a single country.
In this special case, the underlying network and the associated mixed-integer
linear program can be simplified to a bipartite stochastic network interdiction
problem (BiSNIP), which is also shown to be NP-Complete in Section 2.8.
2.2 Notation and Assumptions
Our stochastic network interdiction models require the following pa-
rameters: the probability a smuggler can traverse a physical transportation
arc undetected, the probability that sensitive material will be detected by an
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installed sensor, and the probability a smuggler steals material from a partic-
ular origin and wants to travel to a specific destination. We define the basic
notation for our stochastic network interdiction models as follows.
Network and Sets:
G(N, A) directed network with node set N and arc set A
FS(i) set of arcs leaving node i
RS(i) set of arcs entering node i
AD ⊂ A set of arcs on which a detector can be installed
Data:
b total budget for installing detectors
aij cost of installing a detector on arc (i, j) ∈ AD
pij probability evader can traverse arc (i, j) undetected
when no detector is installed
qij probability evader can traverse arc (i, j) undetected
when a detector is installed
Random Elements:
(sω, tω) realization of random origin-destination pair
ω ∈ Ω sample point and sample space
pω probability mass function
Interdictor’s Decision Variables:
xij 1 if a detector is installed on arc (i, j) ∈ AD and 0 otherwise
Evader’s Decision Variables:
yij arc flow which takes positive value only if evader traverses arc (i, j)
and no detector is installed on that arc
zij arc flow which takes positive value only if evader traverses arc (i, j)
and a detector is installed on that arc
Boundary Conditions:
xij ≡ 0 (i, j) /∈ AD
zij ≡ 0 (i, j) /∈ AD
Sample space Ω is the collection of origin-destination pairs, and Ω
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doesn’t include more detail on the “type” of evader unless we specify oth-
erwise. The following assumptions are assumed to hold for all the variants of
our stochastic network interdiction models.
General Assumptions:
1. The events of detecting an evader on distinct arcs are mutually
independent.
2. The network topology G(N, A) is known to both the interdictor and the
evader, and there is an sω–tω path, ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
3. The interdictor knows the method by which the evader selects a path and
the probability distribution governing the random (s, t) pair.
2.3 SNIP: Stochastic Network Interdiction Model for
the Informed Evader
In our base model, SNIP, we deal with an informed evader. In addition
to General Assumptions 1–3, the following are assumed to hold.
SNIP Assumptions:
1. An informed evader knows the evasion probability, pij, on each
indigenous arc (i, j) ∈ A.
2. The informed evader knows the location of all the detectors, xij, (i, j) ∈ AD,
and the evasion probability, qij < pij, on each detector arc (i, j) ∈ AD.
























(ysωj + zsωj) = 1 (2.2b)
∑
(i,j)∈FS(i)
(yij + zij) −
∑
(j,i)∈RS(i)




(pjtωyjtω + qjtωzjtω) = 0 (2.2d)
yij ≤ 1 − xij, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.2e)
zij ≤ xij, (i, j) ∈ AD. (2.2f)
The conditional probability a smuggler avoids detection, given (sω, tω), is
h(x, (sω, tω)) as defined in (2.2). The objective function in (2.1) is the un-
conditional evasion probability, formed by the weighted sum over all possible
origin-destination pairs. The set of feasible detector installation locations de-
fined through X is governed by a budget constraint and binary restrictions on
x.
The network on which the evader travels contains interdictable and
non-interdictable arcs (see Figure 2.1). Each link in the network on which a
detector can be placed may be viewed as two arcs in parallel. If a detector is
installed, i.e., xij = 1, then flow may only occur on the “detector” arc with




( zij , qij ,  xij  ) 
( yij , pij , 1  )  i j 
interdictable arc non-interdictable arc 
( yij , pij , 1 -  xij  ) 
Figure 2.1: The graph shows two arc types: an interdictable arc and a non-
interdictable arc. The triple associated with each arc denotes (flow decision variable,
gain, capacity). Arc capacities on interdictable arcs force flow onto the “detector”
arc if a detector is installed.
Conversely, if no detector is installed, i.e., xij = 0, flow can only occur on the
indigenous arc. A unit of flow on arc (i, j) is multiplied by that arc’s gain




[pij(1 − xij) + qijxij] (2.3)
is the probability that an evader can travel from sω to tω on Psω ,tω without
being detected. The evader’s goal is to select a path Psω ,tω that maximizes ytω .
The evader’s subproblem (2.2) accomplishes this by forcing one unit of flow out
of sω in (2.2b), enforcing flow conservation at all intermediate nodes in (2.2c),
defining the flow that reaches tω as ytω in (2.2d) and maximizing that value in
(2.2a). Flow is forced on the appropriate arc, and incurs the associated gain
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(actually, loss), by the interdictor’s decision variable xij in constraints (2.2e)
and (2.2f).
Important elements of SNIP include the timing of the interdictor’s and
evader’s decisions related to the realization of the smuggler’s origin-destination
pair, and the information available to the interdictor and evader. The timing
of decisions and the realization of the uncertainty in (2.1) is as follows: First,
the interdictor selects sites for installing sensors, subject to the budget con-
straint. Next, an (sω, tω) realization is revealed, and the evader selects an sω–tω
path that maximizes the probability of not being detected. Both the General
Assumptions and the SNIP Assumptions are in place for SNIP. Assuming the
smuggler solves an optimization model to select an sω–tω path is a behavioral
assumption. In Sections 2.4–2.6, we develop model variants with different
behavioral assumptions. We note that even in cases when this assumption
may not be valid, the optimal value of (2.1) still provides a potentially useful
pessimistic prediction of the evasion probability.
The SNIP model (2.1) is a bi-level stochastic mixed-integer linear pro-
gram. In bi-level programs (e.g., [10, 9, 16, 56]) both players have an objective
function, and these can differ because the players’ motives differ. In our case,
the objective function is the same for both players, but the interdictor seeks to
minimize that function while the evader wishes to maximize it. SNIP (2.1) is
formulated with a nested “min-max” structure, and so it is not possible to solve
in this form as a single large-scale mathematical program. One natural way
to attempt to circumvent this difficulty (see e.g., [26, 64]) is to take the dual
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of the linear programming subproblem (2.2) so that the problem is expressed
in a nested “min-min” form. We could then construct a single optimization
model in which we simultaneously minimize over the interdictor’s decision x
and the (dual) decision variables of the evader under each scenario, ω ∈ Ω.
The difficulty with this approach is that there are nonlinear terms involving
x and the dual variables associated with constraints (2.2e) and (2.2f) and the
prospects for solving realistically-sized instances of the resulting stochastic
nonlinear nonconvex mixed-integer program are not good. Instead we employ
the exact-penalty result of Lemma 2.3.1, which is adapted from [41, Lemma
2], in order to reformulate (2.2).




s.t. Ax = b : π
x ≤ u : γ,
(2.4)
where A ∈ m×n, the remaining vectors are dimensioned to conform, and π
and γ are dual row vectors. Assume (2.4) has a finite optimal solution, (π∗, γ∗)
is an arbitrary optimal dual vector, and consider
z∗2 = max
x≥0
cx − γ′(x − u)+
s.t. Ax = b,
(2.5)
where (x − u)+ = max(x − u, 0) and γ′ ∈ n. If γ′ ≥ γ∗ then z∗1 = z∗2.








and by linear programming strong duality, zD1 = z
∗
1 . Adding an upper bound




s.t. πA + γ ≥ c : x
γ ≤ γ′ : −y
γ ≥ 0.
(2.7)




s.t. Ax = b
x − y ≤ u.
(2.8)
By strong duality, z∗3 = z
D
2 . Since y ≥ 0 and γ′ ≥ 0, we can ensure there is an
optimal solution with y = (x − u)+. Therefore, z∗2 = z∗3 = z∗1 .
The following theorem uses Lemma 2.3.1 to establish an equivalent
expression to (2.2) for h(x, (sω, tω)).
Theorem 2.3.2. Assume that G has an sω–tω path ∀ω ∈ Ω, 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1,
(i, j) ∈ A, and 0 ≤ qij ≤ 1, (i, j) ∈ AD. Then, for all x ∈ X and ω ∈ Ω,




s.t. πi − pijπj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ AD (2.9a)
πi − pijπj ≥ −xij, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.9b)
πi − qijπj ≥ xij − 1, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.9c)
πtω = 1.
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Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X. G has an sω-tω path and hence (2.2) is feasible
and has a finite optimal solution. Let λ∗ij and γ
∗
ij, (i, j) ∈ AD, be optimal dual
variables for constraints (2.2e) and (2.2f), respectively. These dual variables
are bounded above by one because the network gains, pij, (i, j) ∈ A, and qij,
(i, j) ∈ AD, are at most unity and hence an increase in the capacity of an arc
by ε can increase the flow exiting that arc by no more than ε and therefore
contribute at most ε to the flow reaching tω. So, employing Lemma 2.3.1 we




















(pjtωyjtω + qjtωzjtω) = 0.
(2.10)
Because of the binary nature of x ∈ X, we have (yij − (1 − xij))+ = xijyij and
(zij −xij)+ = (1−xij)zij for yij and zij, (i, j) ∈ AD, satisfying the constraints
of (2.10). Making these substitutions in the objective function of (2.10) and
taking the dual of the resulting linear program yields (2.9).
The expression for h(x, (sω, tω)) in (2.9) has the following interpreta-
tion: The dual variable πi is the conditional probability of the evader traveling
from node i to destination tω undetected, given that the evader has reached
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node i undetected. Constraints (2.9a)-(2.9c), coupled with minimizing the ob-
jective function, ensure the correct computation of πsω , i.e., the probability of
traversing the network from sω to tω undetected. In (2.9), the evader selects
a maximum-reliability path, and constraints (2.9a)-(2.9c) are tight for (i, j)
on this selected path. When xij = 1, i.e., a detector is installed on (i, j), the
indigenous-arc constraint (2.9b) is vacuous and when xij = 0 the detector-
arc constraint (2.9c) is vacuous. The unit multiplicative coefficients on the
right-hand sides of (2.9b) and (2.9c) can be decreased to tighten the MIP for-
mulation of SNIP that we present below in (2.11). For example, (2.9b) can be
rewritten πi −pijπj ≥ −αijxij, provided the coefficient αij satisfies αij ≥ pijπj.
We do not pursue this issue now but will return to it in our computational
work in Chapter 4.
The value of Theorem 2.3.2 is that we can now express our origi-
nal nested “min-max” formulation of the interdiction model for the informed
evader, i.e., (2.1) with (2.2), as the following two-stage stochastic mixed-integer







s.t. x ∈ X
πωi − pijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ AD, ω ∈ Ω (2.11a)
πωi − pijπωj + xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD, ω ∈ Ω (2.11b)
πωi − qijπωj + (1 − xij) ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD, ω ∈ Ω (2.11c)
πtω = 1, ω ∈ Ω. (2.11d)
2.4 U-SNIP: Stochastic Network Interdiction Model for
the Uninformed Evader
For an uninformed evader, in addition to General Assumptions 1-3, the
following are assumed to hold.
U-SNIP Assumptions:
1. The evader knows the evasion probability, pij, on each indigenous
arc (i, j) ∈ A.
2. The evader has no information regarding sensor locations and the evasion
probabilities, qij, on the detector arcs, (i, j) ∈ AD.
In U-SNIP, the evader behaves as if detectors do not exist and selects a
maximum-reliability path based on the indigenous network. As indicated in
the General Assumptions, the interdictor knows the means by which the un-
informed evader’s path is selected.
Assume, for the moment, that for each origin-destination pair, (sω, tω),
ω ∈ Ω, that the evader’s optimal path, P ∗(sω, tω), in the indigenous network
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is unique. Then the interdictor can restrict sensor installations to the inter-






s.t. x ∈ X
πωi − pijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ P ∗(sω, tω) \ AD, ω ∈ Ω (2.12a)
πωi − pijπωj + xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD(sω, tω), ω ∈ Ω (2.12b)
πωi − qijπωj + (1 − xij) ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD(sω, tω), ω ∈ Ω (2.12c)
πtω = 1, ω ∈ Ω, (2.12d)
where AD(sω, tω) = P ∗(sω, tω) ∩ AD. In forming an instance of U-SNIP, we
can compute P ∗(sω, tω), ω ∈ Ω, in a pre-processing step because the evader’s
path does not depend on x. If the evader’s optimal path in the indigenous
network is not unique then further assumptions are required. One possibility
is that the interdictor knows the means by which the smuggler breaks ties.
Hence, P ∗(sω, tω), ω ∈ Ω, is known. Alternatively, we could assume that the
evader breaks ties arbitrarily, i.e., that every optimal path is equally likely to
be selected, and simply expand the sample space and associated distribution
accordingly. For example, if ω̂ has three optimal paths then we replace sample
point ω̂ with ω̂1, ω̂2, and ω̂3 with probabilities 13p
ω̂1 , 13p
ω̂2 , and 13p
ω̂3 . Of course,
other distributions governing tie-breaking can be captured similarly. So, when
multiple maximum-reliability paths exist, we may still achieve a model in the
form of U-SNIP.
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2.5 UI-SNIP: Stochastic Network Interdiction Model
for Mixed Population of Evaders
So far we have developed models in which the evaders are informed
(SNIP) and in which the evaders are uninformed (U-SNIP). Next, we develop
a hybrid model in which the population of possible evaders consists of both
types. Let Ω = ΩU ∪ ΩI partition the sample space into uninformed and
informed evaders and assume pω, ω ∈ Ω, is known. Then we formulate our






s.t. x ∈ X
πω satisfies (2.11a) − (2.11d), ω ∈ ΩI
πω satisfies (2.12a) − (2.12d), ω ∈ ΩU .
In UI-SNIP, when an uninformed evader has multiple optimal paths, this can
be handled as described above for U-SNIP. We note that UI-SNIP generalizes
both SNIP and U-SNIP in this sense that both these models are special cases
of UI-SNIP.
2.6 P-SNIP: Stochastic Network Interdiction Model for
the Evader with Different Perceptions
In last three sections, we developed stochastic network interdiction
models for populations that may contain some mixture of informed and unin-
formed evaders. Although these two types of evaders have access to different
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levels of information and hence react differently to interdiction decisions, they
have the same perception as the interdictor of the network parameters (pij and
qij) that they observe. In this section, we generalize this assumption in model
P-SNIP by allowing the interdictor and evader to have different perceptions of
these network parameters. In addition to the General Assumptions, we assume
the following for P-SNIP.
P-SNIP Assumptions:
1. The evader and interdictor have possibly different perceptions of the
evasion probabilities on the indigenous arcs and the evasion probabilities
on the detector arcs.
We redefine some of the notation from Section 2.2 to accommodate two sets
of perceptions.
Data:
p1ij interdictor’s perception of the probability that the evader can traverse
arc (i, j) undetected when no detector is installed
q1ij interdictor’s perception of the probability that the evader can traverse
arc (i, j) undetected when a detector is installed; q1ij < p
1
ij
p2ij evader’s perception of the probability that the evader can traverse
arc (i, j) undetected when no detector is installed
q2ij evader’s perception of the probability that the evader can traverse
arc (i, j) undetected when a detector is installed; q2ij ≤ p2ij
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Interdictor’s Decision Variables:








ij defined below except that they are used
to compute the interdictor’s perception of the probability the evader
avoids detection
y2ij arc flow which takes positive value only if the evader perceives
no detector installed on that arc (i, j) and traverses arc (i, j)
z2ij arc flow which takes positive value only if the evader perceives
a detector installed on arc (i, j) and traverses arc (i, j)
Boundary Conditions:
xij ≡ 0 (i, j) /∈ AD
z1ij ≡ 0 (i, j) /∈ AD
z2ij ≡ 0 (i, j) /∈ AD





q2ij for all arcs. Hence, the interdictor knows all the information the evader
will use to select what the evader perceives to be a maximum reliability sω–tω
path, ω ∈ Ω.
P-SNIP can capture the possibility that the evader is only aware of
a subset of detector locations. In particular, if p2ij > q
2
ij, the evader knows
whether a sensor is installed on arc (i, j); if p2ij = q
2
ij, the evader doesn’t
become aware whether a sensor is installed on arc (i, j). In the latter case, q2ij
and z2ij can be eliminated from the model, but for the notational simplicity we
won’t treat this separately.
Similar to the SNIP model, x is the first stage decision variable. After
an origin-destination pair (sω, tω) is revealed, the evader chooses an sω–tω
path to maximize the probability of avoiding detection, and the evader selects
31
a path with the knowledge of sensor locations and the (p2ij/q
2
ij) perception on
the network parameters. The interdictor reevaluates the evasion probability of
the path the evader has chosen using the “true” network parameters, p1ij/q
1
ij. In
the second stage, the interdictor’s reevaluation is done with decision variables
y1 and z1 and the evader’s maximum-reliability path is selected via y2 and z2.
We formulate P-SNIP for the stochastic network interdiction model
























































= 0 : π1tω (2.15d)
y1ij ≤ 1 − xij, (i, j) ∈ AD : λ1ij (2.15e)
y1ij ≤ My2ij, (i, j) ∈ A : αij (2.15f)
z1ij ≤ xij, (i, j) ∈ AD : γ1ij (2.15g)
z1ij ≤ My2ij + Mz2ij, (i, j) ∈ AD : βij (2.15h)
y1ij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A (2.15i)
z1ij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.15j)
(y2, z2) ∈ Y 2(x, ω). (2.15k)
Constraints (2.15e) and (2.15f) allow y1ij to take positive flow if there is no
sensor on arc (i, j) (xij = 0), and arc (i, j) is on the evader’s optimal path
(y2ij > 0). In a similar way, constraints (2.15g) and (2.15h) allow z
1
ij to be
positive if xij = 1 and either y2ij > 0 or z
2
ij > 0. We state the latter condition
in this form because the evader may be unaware of a potential sensor (p2ij = q
2
ij)
and could traverse (i, j) as if it has no sensor. For a given interdiction plan
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0 ≤ y2ij ≤ 1 − xij, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.16e)
0 ≤ z2ij ≤ xij, (i, j) ∈ AD. (2.16f)
In contrast to SNIP (2.1) with second-stage problem (2.2), in P-SNIP the
second-stage problem is a bilevel program. The P-SNIP model generalizes the
models of Sections 2.3–2.5. In (2.14), if p2 = p1 and q2 = q1, P-SNIP becomes
SNIP for the informed evader; if p2 = p1 and q2 = p1, P-SNIP becomes U-SNIP
for the uninformed evader. The mixed-population model can be captured by
appending an ω index to q2,ω and making the former or latter assignments for
ω ∈ ΩI and ω ∈ ΩU , respectively.
To solve (2.14), we seek to reformulate the model as a single non-
nested mathematical program. Since the second-stage problem is a bilevel
optimization problem, we first convert it to a single mathematical program.
In our problem, the feasible region of the interdictor’s second-stage problem
(2.15) depends on the evader’s solution (y2, z2). The evader’s maximization
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problem is of the same form as (2.2) in Section 2.3, and the equivalent dual
formulation is given as (2.9) in Theorem 2.3.2. We enforce (y2, z2) ∈ Y 2(x, ω)




































= 0 : π3tω (2.17c)
0 ≤ y2ij ≤ 1 − xij, (i, j) ∈ AD : λ3ij (2.17d)
0 ≤ z2ij ≤ xij, (i, j) ∈ AD : γ3ij (2.17e)
πωi − p2ijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ AD : −y3ij (2.17f)
πωi − p2ijπωj + xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD : −y3ij (2.17g)
πωi − q2ijπωj + (1 − xij) ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD : −z3ij (2.17h)
πtω = 1 : −y3tω (2.17i)
πsω = ytω : θ (2.17j)
Constraints (2.17a)–(2.17e) describe the primal feasible region, and constraints
(2.17f)–(2.17i) provide the dual feasible region. Constraint (2.17j) is the condi-
tion for strong duality. Since (2.16) is a LP, for any element (y2, z2) ∈ Y 2(x, ω),
there exists a dual optimal solution π such that (y2, z2, π) satisfies (2.17).
35
Therefore,
h(x, (sω, tω)) = max
y1,z1,y2,z2,π
y1tω (2.18a)
s.t. (y1, z1) satisfies (2.15b) − (2.15j) (2.18b)
(y2, z2, π) satisfies (2.17). (2.18c)
With (2.18) the second-stage problem is expressed as a linear program, and
the resulting two-stage network interdiction model has a “min-max” structure.
To transform the model to a single mathematical program, we will take the
dual of the second-stage model, but first we replace (2.17g) with
πωi − p2ijπωj + λ̂ij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.19a)
0 ≤ λ̂ij ≤ xij, (i, j) ∈ AD. (2.19b)
Similarly, we replace (2.17h) with
πωi − q2ijπωj + γ̂ij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.20a)
0 ≤ γ̂ij ≤ 1 − xij, (i, j) ∈ AD. (2.20b)
In Section 2.3 we applied Lemma 2.3.1 to the second-stage linear program (2.2)
in order to avoid nonlinearities which would otherwise arise when taking the
dual of (2.2). With analogous motivation, we apply Lemma 2.3.1 to (2.18) and
specifically to the simple bound constraints (2.15e), (2.15g), (2.17d), (2.17e),










ij + λ̂ij)(1 − xij), (2.21)
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and the dual of the resulting linear program is





s.t. π1i − p1ijπ1j + αij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ AD (2.22a)
π1i − p1ijπ1j + xij + αij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.22b)
π1i − q1ijπ1j + (1 − xij) + βij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.22c)
π1tω ≥ 1 (2.22d)
π3i − p2ijπ3j − Mαij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ AD (2.22e)
π3i − p2ijπ3j + xij − M(αij + βij) ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD(2.22f)
π3i − q2ijπ3j + (1 − xij) − Mβij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD(2.22g)




































0 ≤ y3ij ≤ 1 − xij, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.22l)
0 ≤ z3ij ≤ xij, (i, j) ∈ AD (2.22m)
αij ≥ 0, βij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ AD. (2.22n)
Now, we have a “min-min” structure as we can combine (2.14) and (2.22) into
a single mixed-integer linear program.
We have introduced several stochastic network interdiction models which
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involve different information levels and different perceptions of the network pa-
rameters. In the remainder of the dissertation, we will focus on the stochastic
network interdiction model for an informed evader (SNIP) and we first discuss
an important special case on a bipartite network.
2.7 Bipartite Stochastic Network Interdiction Model
In certain applications, an evader attempts to smuggle material out of
a single country, and the interdictor is restricted to install detectors on the
border of that country. In such cases, when the origin is inside the country and
the destination outside the country, we assume the smuggler will encounter at
most one sensor, namely when crossing the country’s border. As discussed
in the introduction, the SLD program motivates such an example for material
stored within Russia and with detectors installed on Russia’s border, including
airports, seaports, and land crossings.
Our underlying transportation network model for a single country has
four basic location entities: sources from which sensitive material could be
stolen, geographic provinces, destinations outside the country where a evader
may desire to go, and border checkpoints or border crossing where sensors can
be installed. The nominal transportation network has a node representing
each of these locations (some aggregation is possible as we describe below).
These nodes are linked by arcs representing transport by surface roads, rail-
roads, airline flights, ship transport, etc. A border checkpoint is modeled by







Figure 2.2: The graph shows the interdiction network for a single country.
point. Figure 2.2 illustrates four location entities and the connectivity among
them.
The key to simplifying the formulation, when we consider the border
checkpoints of a single country, is that on each potential smuggling route (i.e.,
each possible sω-tω path) there is exactly one arc on which the smuggler could
encounter a sensor. We formalize this in the following manner: Let Pω be the
set of all paths for origin-destination pair (sω, tω). (These paths need not be
enumerated.) Then, in our BiSNIP model (bipartite SNIP, for reasons soon
apparent) we assume that each path in Pω contains exactly one arc in AD,
i.e., each path has exactly one arc that is a candidate to receive a sensor. Let
ADω = {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ AD, (i, j) ∈ Pω} be all such checkpoint arcs for ω ∈ Ω.
The evader, under scenario ω, must select an sω-tω path, but this now depends
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on the sensor locations in a much simpler way than in the SNIP model. For
each ω, we perform a preprocessing step to compute the value of the maximum-
reliability path from sω to the tail of each checkpoint arc and the value of the
maximum-reliability path from the head of each checkpoint arc to tω. Call
the product of these two probabilities γωc , c = (i, j) ∈ ADω. Figure 2.3 shows
the preprocessing steps to transform the network in Figure 2.2 to a bipartite
network. Then, the value of the maximum-reliability path under scenario ω is
h(x, (sω, tω)) = max
c∈ADω
{γωc pc(1 − xc), γωc qcxc} . (2.23)










acxc ≤ b (2.24a)
θω ≥ γωc pc(1 − xc), c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (2.24b)
θω ≥ γωc qcxc, c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (2.24c)
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD. (2.24d)
BiSNIP (2.24) may be visualized on an underlying bipartite network with node
sets Ω and AD as shown in Figure 2.3(b). Arcs (ω, c) link each scenario ω ∈ Ω
(facility-destination pair) with its possible intermediate checkpoints, c ∈ ADω.
Excluding the possibility of being detected at the checkpoint, γωc is the evader’s
probability of traveling from ω’s facility to ω’s destination, via c, undetected.









Figure 2.3: (a) The graph shows that preprocessing reduces the network to two
pieces, from a source to the tail of a bordering-crossing arc and from the head of
that bordering-crossing arc to a destination. (b) The graph shows the bipartite
network structure and the connectivity between each scenario ω and each border
crossing c.
installed at checkpoint c. In our computational work, we will assume aij = 1
for all interdictable arcs and in this case (2.24a) simply reduces to a cardinality
constraint, where b is the number of sensors that can be installed.
2.8 Complexity
In this section, we establish the complexity of our stochastic network
interdiction models. First, we prove that BiSNIP is NP-Complete by trans-
forming the Clique problem to the corresponding decision problem BiSNIP-
Decision.
The following defines the Clique decision problem:
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Clique:
Instance: Graph G(V, E), a positive integer k ≤ |V |.
Question: Does G have a clique of size k or more, that is, a subset W ⊆ V
such that |W | ≥ k and every two vertices in W are joined by an edge in
E?
Here, we consider a special case of BiSNIP (2.24). We assume unit
installation costs, ac = 1, c ∈ AD, and “certain” interdiction success prob-
abilities at each customs site, qc = 0, c ∈ AD. We also assume a uniform
underlying distribution, pω = 1|Ω| , ω ∈ Ω. Let rωc = γωc pc, c ∈ AD. The MIP










θω ≥ rωc (1 − xc), c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD.
(2.25)
Because of the uniform distribution, we have omitted pω in the objective func-
tion in (2.25) for simplicity. The decision problem of (2.25) is
BiSNIP-Decision:
Instance: Bipartite graph B(Ω, AD, A), positive arc gain rωc , (ω, c) ∈ A, a
positive integer b, and a positive real α.
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Question: Does there exist a subset S ⊆ AD of size b such that if S is
removed from AD, then ∑
ω∈Ω
θω ≤ α,
where θω = max {rωc : (ω, c) ∈ A, c ∈ AD \ S}?
Theorem 2.8.1. BiSNIP-Decision is strongly NP-Complete.
Proof. We first establish that BiSNIP-Decision belongs to the class NP, and
then reduce Clique, which is known to be NP-Complete in the strong sense,
to BiSNIP-Decision. To see that BiSNIP-Decision belongs to NP, note
that a polynomial-length guess for an instance of BiSNIP-Decision consists
of S ⊆ AD with |S| = b. To test whether or not such a guess verifies a







and then do a simple comparison. So, the number of steps required to verify
a guess is bounded by O(|Ω||AD|), which proves that BiSNIP-Decision is in
NP.
Next, we transform Clique to BiSNIP-Decision. We construct a
bipartite graph BG(ΩG, ADG, AG) from G(V, E) in the statement of Clique
as follows. For each node v ∈ V , create a node v ∈ ADG. For each edge
e ∈ E, create a node e ∈ ΩG. The bipartite network arcs are constructed as
follows: for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, create arcs (e, u) ∈ AG with reu = 1
and (e, v) ∈ AG with rev = 1. Finally, set the cardinality restriction b = k and
objective target α = |E| − (k2).
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We must show that the original Clique instance is a yes-instance if
and only if the transformed BiSNIP-Decision instance is a yes-instance. In















Suppose the BiSNIP-Decision instance is a yes-instance. Then, there exists































. Let T = {e = (u, v) ∈ E : u, v ∈ S}.





arcs for a graph with k nodes, |T | = (k2) with
|S| = k. Therefore, S is a clique of size k in graph G, and the original Clique
instance is a yes-instance.
Now, suppose the Clique instance is a yes-instance. Let S be a clique

























Therefore, if we remove node set S from ADG then BiSNIP-Decision is a
yes-instance.
Since the foregoing transformation can be accomplished in polynomial
time, and all of the data from the transformation is polynomially bounded, we
have that BiSNIP-Decision is strongly NP-Complete.
The theorem establishes that BiSNIP-Decision is strongly NP-Complete and,
in this sense we can regard (2.29) as being strongly NP-Complete. BiSNIP is
a special case of SNIP, and hence SNIP is strongly NP-Complete. For a direct
proof that SNIP, or rather its related decision problem, is NP-Complete we
refer to [49].
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced several stochastic network interdiction
models to minimize the chance of a successful smuggling attempt. The models
differ with respect to the information available to the adversaries, the relative
perceptions of the interdictor and the adversary of the network’s parameters,
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and where in the network detectors can be placed. In subsequent chapters, we
will discuss solution techniques for BiSNIP and SNIP.
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Chapter 3
Solution Methods For BiSNIP
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss solution methods for BiSNIP, the special
case of SNIP in which detectors can only be installed on the boundary of the
region in question. BiSNIP, introduced in Section 2.7, is formulated as the





{γωc pc(1 − xc), γωc qcxc}], (3.1)
where x ∈ X includes the budget constraint and binary restrictions on x, and
where γωc is the evasion probability on the most reliable path from ω’s origin
through border crossing c to ω’s destination not including the border crossing
evasion probability pc or qc on the indigenous border-crossing arc or detector
border-crossing arc.
In this chapter, we develop techniques to solve BiSNIP via the branch-
and-bound method. We mainly focus on preprocessing techniques, structural
properties of the feasible region for BiSNIP, and a class of valid inequalities
for tightening the LP relaxation of BiSNIP. In Section 3.2, we introduce basic
properties of BiSNIP and explore some preprocessing techniques to reduce the
number of constraints and binary variables. Section 3.3 introduces structure
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dependent valid inequalities, which we term step inequalities. We start with the
two-step inequality, then we derive the step inequality with arbitrary number of
steps. We provide conditions under which step inequalities are facet-defining.
And, we give an algorithm to detect violated step inequalities and add them
in the course of solving BiSNIP. Finally, we provide computational results to
show the improvement of applying step inequalities.
3.2 Basic Formulation and Preprocessing










θω ≥ γωc pc(1 − xc), c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
θω ≥ γωc qcxc, c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD.
(3.2)
Let q̂ω = max
c∈ADω
γωc qc, ω ∈ Ω. Then, q̂ω provides a lower bound for θω. Let
rωc =
{
γωc pc − q̂ω if γωc pc > q̂ω
0 if otherwise, (3.3)
c ∈ ADω. In the context of nuclear smuggling interdiction, q̂ω is the optimal
evasion probability in scenario ω with monitors being installed at all possible
interdictable arcs, and rωc is the marginal increase in the evasion probability
due to selecting an uninterdicted path through c over q̂ω. Here, we assume











xc ≤ b (3.4a)
θω ≥ rωc (1 − xc), c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (3.4b)
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD. (3.4c)
By BiSNIP we mean formulation (3.4) in the rest of this dissertation.
Lemma 3.2.1. With ac = 1, c ∈ AD, formulation (3.2) and (3.4) have the
same set of optimal solutions and optimal values that differ by the constant∑
ω∈Ω
pω q̂ω.
Proof. For ω ∈ Ω, since pc ≥ qc and γωc ≥ 0, c ∈ AD, γωc pc ≥ γωc qc. Since
q̂ω = max
c∈ADω
γωc qc, ω ∈ Ω, constraints
θω ≥ γωc qcxc, c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
can be replaced by
θω ≥ q̂ω, ω ∈ Ω.
Let θ̂ω = θω − q̂ω. We have θ̂ω ≥ 0, and constraint θω ≥ γωc pc(1 − xc) becomes
θ̂ω ≥ γωc pc(1 − xc) − q̂ω. (3.5)
For a fixed x,
γωc pc(1 − xc) − q̂ω =
{
γωc pc − q̂ω if xc = 0
−q̂ω if xc = 1.
49
Since θ̂ ≥ 0, inequality (3.5) can be simplified to
θ̂ω ≥ rωc (1 − xc),
where rωc is defined in (3.3). For an arbitrary feasible x, since x is binary, the




















pω max { max
c∈ADω










pω max { max
c∈ADω




Therefore, formulations (3.2) and (3.4) have the same set of optimal solutions,




Let BiSNI be the feasible region of BiSNIP (3.4),
BiSNI = {(x, θ) :
∑
c∈AD
xc, ≤ b, xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ ADω, θω ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω,
θω ≥ rωc (1 − xc), c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω},




1. The dimension of conv(BiSNI) is |AD| + |Ω| for b = 1, · · · , n.
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2. For b = 1, · · · , n, xc ≥ 0 defines a facet for conv(BiSNI), c ∈ AD.
3. For b = 2, · · · , n, xc ≤ 1 defines a facet for conv(BiSNI), c ∈ AD.




xc ≤ b defines a facet for conv(BiSNI) if b = 1, · · · , n − 1.
6. θω ≥ rωc (1−xc) defines a facet for conv(BiSNI) if and only if |ADω| = 1
and b = 1, · · · , n − 1.
Proof. We only prove part 2 as proofs of the other parts are similar. For
b ∈ {1, · · · , n} and c ∈ AD, we show that inequality xc ≥ 0 defines a facet for
conv(BiSNI) by constructing |AD| + |Ω| affinely independent feasible points
(v0, vω, ω ∈ Ω, and vi, i ∈ AD \ {c}) at which xc = 0. All point are in the
form of (x, θ), and ei is the (|AD| + |Ω|)-dimension unit vector which has 1 in














r̄ωeω + ei, i ∈ AD \ {c}.
(3.6)
In all of the above points, θω ≥ r̄ω, ω ∈ Ω, and there is at most one component
of x at 1 with the others of 0. So, these points are in conv(BiSNI). Also, xc = 0
in each point, and so inequality xc ≥ 0 holds with equality.
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Let uk = vk − v0 for k ∈ AD ∪ Ω, then
uω = eω, ω ∈ Ω,
ui = ei, i ∈ AD \ {c}.
Since the u’s are linearly independent points, the points in (3.6) are affinely
independent. Therefore, inequality xc ≥ 0 defines a facet for conv(BiSNIP).
3.3 Step Inequalities
Coefficient reduction, probing and cutting planes are frequently used to
preprocess and improve an MIP formulation. Before solving a mixed-integer
linear program, we want to tighten its LP relaxation and reduce the integrality
gap between the mixed-integer linear program and its LP relaxation so that
branch-and-bound methods will require less computational time. In this sec-
tion, we derive a class of structure-dependent valid inequalities, similar to the
star inequality in [3], to tighten the BiSNIP formulation.
3.3.1 BiSNIP’s LP Relaxation
To understand how we can tighten BiSNIP’s formulation via valid in-








xc ≤ b (3.7a)
θ ≥ rc(1 − xc), c ∈ AD (3.7b)
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD. (3.7c)
Without loss of generality, assume rc1 ≥ rc2 ≥ · · · ≥ rc|AD| > 0 and let
rc|AD|+1 = 0. For b ∈ {0, · · · , |AD|}, z1(b) = rb+1. In an optimal solution of
(3.7), x∗ci = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ b and x∗c1 = 0 for ci > b. The following ordering
inequality
xc ≥ xc′ if rc ≥ rc′ (3.8)
is satisfied at x∗ for any pair of c, c′ ∈ AD, c = c′. Let z1LP (b) be the optimal
objective value of the LP relaxation of (3.7). For the given z1LP (b), we can find
an index ck such that rck > z
1








Then, an optimal solution xLP∗ of the LP relaxation problem is
xLP∗c =
{
(rc − z1LP (b))/rc if rc > z1LP (b)
0 if rc ≤ z1LP (b).
The LP relaxation solution xLP∗ also satisfies the ordering inequality (3.8). In
fact, for any b < |AD|, xLP∗c < 1 for c ∈ AD. The following example illustrates
the difference between objective values of the single scenario problem, (3.7),








Figure 3.1: The graph shows the difference between the MIP solution and its LP
relaxation solution for a single-scenario BiSNIP.




s.t. x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 2
θ ≥ r1(1 − x1)
θ ≥ r2(1 − x2)
θ ≥ r3(1 − x3)
x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}.
(3.9)
The optimal solution of (3.9) is (x∗, θ∗) = (1, 1, 0, r3). But in its LP relaxation,
to achieve θ = r3, we only require that xLP1 ≥ r1−r3r1 and xLP2 ≥ r2−r3r2 (see







< 2, we can already achieve
θ = r3 in the LP relaxation.
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In the related stochastic version of problem (3.4), let (xLP∗, θLP∗) be
an optimal solution for the LP relaxation of BiSNIP.




max { rωc −θωLP∗
rωc
: ω ∈ Ω, rωc > θωLP∗} if ∃ω ∈ Ω, rωc > θωLP∗
0 if rωc ≤ θωLP∗, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
(3.10)
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume rωc > 0, c ∈ ADω and ω ∈ Ω.





constraint (3.4b) for (ω, c) pair becomes
θωLP∗ ≥ rωc (1 − xLP∗c ) > θωLP∗,
which contradicts that (xLP∗, θLP∗) is a feasible solution. Therefore, xLP∗c ≥
rωc −θωLP∗
rωc
, for ω ∈ Ω with rωc > θωLP∗.






: ω ∈ Ω, rωc′ > θωLP∗
}
> 0 for some
c′ ∈ AD. Let θ̂ = θLP∗, x̂c = xLP∗c , c ∈ AD \ {c′}, and x̂c′ = xLP∗c′ − ε. Then,
(x̂, θ̂) is a feasible solution of BiSNIP, and
∑
c∈AD
x̂c = b − ε ≤ b.
For δ > 0, let θ̂ω̃ = θω̃LP∗ − δ for an arbitrary ω̃ ∈ Ω. Define A = {c′ ∈ ADω̃ :
rω̃c′ > θ̂
ω̃}, and set x̂c′ = xLP∗c′ + δrω̃
c′












pωθωLP∗. This contradicts that (xLP∗, θLP∗) is an optimal solution. There-






: ω ∈ Ω, rωc′ > θωLP∗
}
. We can use a similar argu-
ment to show that xLP∗c = 0 if r
ω
c ≤ θωLP∗, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Corollary 3.3.2. Let (xLP∗, θLP∗) be an optimal solution for the LP relaxation
of BiSNIP. Then,





2. xLP∗c = 1 if and only if θ
ωLP∗ = 0 for some ω ∈ Ω and c ∈ ADω;
3. for c, c′ ∈ AD, if rωc ≥ rωc′, ∀ω ∈ Ω, then xLP∗c ≥ xLP∗c′ ;
4. if xLP∗c > x
LP∗




Part 1 of Corollary 3.3.2 is a direct implication of Theorem 3.3.1. Part




= 1 if and only if θω = 0. In part 3, if rωc ≥ rωc′ ,











: ω ∈ Ω, rωc′ > θωLP∗
}
.
Finally, part 3 implies part 4. Corollary 3.3.2 provides some helpful results in
our development of valid inequalities in later sections.
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3.3.2 Two-step Inequality
For each pair (ω, c) where ω ∈ Ω and c ∈ ADω, constraint (3.4b) of
BiSNIP is simply:
θω ≥ rωc − rωc xc. (3.11)
In the above inequality, θω can be reduced from rωc to 0 in one step in which
xc increases from 0 to 1. So, if we view (3.11) as a one-step inequality, we can
term the following as a two-step inequality,
θω ≥ rωc − (rωc − rωc′)xc − rωc′xc′ (3.12)
where (ω, c, c′) satisfies ω ∈ Ω, c, c′ ∈ ADω and rωc > rωc′ . In the two-step
inequality, θω is reduced in two steps, from rωc to r
ω
c′ to 0 by first increasing xc
from 0 to 1 and then increasing xc′ from 0 to 1.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let ω ∈ Ω, c, c′ ∈ ADω with rωc > rωc′. Then, the two-step
inequality (3.12) is valid for BiSNIP.
Proof. Let (x̂, θ̂) ∈ BiSNI. There are four cases of interest with combinations
of different values of x̂c and x̂c′ :
1. Assume x̂c = x̂c′ = 0. Then, by constraints (3.4b) θ̂ω ≥ rωc , and the
right-hand side of (3.12) is rωc − (rωc − rωc′)x̂c − rωc′x̂c′ = rωc . Thus, the
two-step inequality is valid in case 1.
2. Assume x̂c = 1, x̂c′ = 0. Then θ̂ω ≥ rωc′ , and rωc −(rωc −rωc′)x̂c−rωc′x̂c′ = rωc′ .
So that, the two-step inequality is valid.
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3. Assume x̂c = 0, x̂c′ = 1. Then, θ̂ω ≥ rωc , and rωc − (rωc − rωc′)x̂c − rωc′x̂c′ =
rωc − rωc′ ≤ rωc .
4. Assume x̂c = 1, x̂c′ = 1. Then, θ̂ω ≥ 0, and rωc − (rωc − rωc′)x̂c − rωc′x̂c′ = 0.
Therefore, the two-step inequality (3.12) is valid for BiSNIP.
In the next example, we show how we apply two-step inequalities to
tighten the LP relaxation formulation of BiSNIP.
Example 3.3.2 (Example 3.3.1 continued). For b = 2, let (xLP∗, θLP∗) be
an optimal solution of the LP relaxation of (3.9). Note θLP∗ > 0, an optimal






, and xLP∗3 =
r3−θLP∗
r3
. Here is a
two-step inequality,
θ ≥ r1 − (r1 − r2)x1 − r2x2, (3.13)
where r1 − (r1 − r2)xLP∗1 − r2xLP∗2 = θLP∗ + θLP∗(1 − r2r1 ) > θLP∗. In another
two-step inequality,
θ ≥ r1 − (r1 − r3)x1 − r3x3,
and r1 −(r1 −r3)xLP∗1 −r3xLP∗3 = θLP∗ +θLP∗(1− r3r1 ) > θLP∗. Both inequalities
cut off (xLP∗, θLP∗) and tighten the LP relaxation of (3.9).
This next lemma shows that there exist two-step inequalities which
improve the LP relaxation of BiSNIP.
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Lemma 3.3.4. Let (xLP∗, θLP∗) be an optimal solution for the LP relaxation




and xLP∗c > x
LP∗
c′ , then the two-step inequality,
θω ≥ rωc − (rωc − rωc′)xc − rωc′xc′ ,
cuts off (xLP∗, θLP∗).








θωLP∗ < θωLP∗ + rωc′(x
LP∗
c − xLP∗c′ )
= rωc (1 − xLP∗c ) + rωc′(xLP∗c − xLP∗c′ )
= rωc − (rωc − rωc′)xLP∗c − rωc′xLP∗c′ .
Therefore, the two-step inequality cuts off (xLP∗, θLP∗).




possible two-step inequalities, ω ∈ Ω.










|ADω| original constraints of form (3.4b). Adding all two-
step inequalities will increase the size of BiSNIP dramatically. So, we instead
iteratively solve the LP relaxation of BiSNIP and carry out the following sep-
aration algorithm to identify violated two-step inequalities for each scenario
and tighten the formulation.
Algorithm 3.3.1. Separation Algorithm for Two-step Inequalities
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Step 0: Set k = 0.
Step 1: In the kth iteration, solve LP relaxation of BiSNIP. Let (θk, xk) be
an optimal solution.
Step 2: For each ω and c, c′ ∈ ADω with rωc > rωc′, calculate βωc,c′ = rωc − (rωc −
rωc′)x
k
c −rωc′xkc′, and if βωc,c′ > θω,k, then add the violated two-step inequality
θω ≥ rωc − (rωc − rωc′)xc − rωc′xc′
to BiSNIP.
Step 3: If there are violated two-step inequalities in Step 2, let k = k + 1
and go to Step 1. Otherwise, stop.
To measure the computational improvement by using two-step inequal-
ities, we use Russia as the country in our specific application of BiSNIP.
There are 85 facilities, 263 border crossings, and 9 destinations. Consider-
ing the structure of the underlying network, we aggregate the 85 sources into
34 sources. We process the problem as described in Section 2.7 and reduce the
problem to (3.2). We use equation (3.3) to calculate rωc , set the installation
cost ac = 1, c ∈ AD, and obtain BiSNIP as in (3.4). As the result of prepro-
cessing and simplification, there are 306 scenarios, 226 binary variables, 6164
bipartite network structure constraints and the cardinality constraint from the
first stage. There are 107,415 two-step inequalities in total. We start with ba-
sic LP relaxation of BiSNIP and apply Algorithm 3.3.1 to iteratively generate
violated two-step inequalities and tighten the LP relaxation formulation. We
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Basic Formulation Tightened Formulation
b rel. gap(%) comp. time rel. gap(%) comp. time sep. time(%) no. of ≥
10 15.60 18 2.97 37 66.22 6143
20 21.84 330 4.50 61 43.25 10098
30 23.66 596 3.96 83 63.1 7179
40 23.95 491 3.79 92 62.57 5300
50 23.82 745 4.06 168 38.86 10919
60 26.03 2257 5.89 289 25.93 5196
70 29.04 7467 8.43 732 11.93 6469
80 30.50 19957 9.03 614 16.44 7289
90 31.27 4431 9.06 423 16.99 10439
100 31.15 4396 8.41 621 10.81 4884
120 28.18 508 5.04 122 71.25 8367
Table 3.1: The table shows the computational effort (in elapsed seconds)
required to solve some representative instances of BiSNIP(b) and tightened
BiSNIP(b) with two-step inequalities under different values of budget b.
only add two-step inequalities at the root node of the branch-and-bound tree.
After no more two-step inequalities can be generated we then solve the tight-
ened LP relaxation as an mixed-integer linear program. The computational
results are shown in Table 3.1 with budget b varying from 10 to 120. Our
separation procedure is implemented in C++ and the LPs and the mixed-
integer linear programs are solved with CPLEX version 8.0. Table 3.1 shows
the computational effort (in elapsed seconds) required to solve the instances
of the basic BiSNIP formulation and the tightened BiSNIP formulation with
two-step inequalities. All test instances are computed in 1.7 GHz, Dell Xeon
dual-processor machine with 2 GB of memory. In Table 3.1,“rel. gap(%)” is
the gap between the optimal value of BiSNIP, z∗(b), and its LP relaxation as a
percentage of z∗(b); “comp. time” is the total computational time in seconds
including solving the LP relaxations, generating and adding two-step inequal-
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ities, and solving the mixed-integer linear program; “sep. time(%)” is the
percentage of total computation time spent generating two-step inequalities;
“no. of ≥” is the number of two-step inequalities generated. The results show
that by adding two-step inequalities, we can reduce the computational time
by a factor of roughly 5 up to 30 and that adding inequalities has particularly
helped on the most difficult problems.
3.3.3 Step Inequality
Based on our discussion of two-step inequalities in Section 3.3.2, we
extend this idea to construct step inequalities with an arbitrary number of
steps. We also discuss the facet properties of a step inequality and construct
the related algorithms for solving BiSNIP by using step inequalities.
Example 3.3.3 (Examples 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 continued). In (3.9), we can
add the following three-step inequality
θ ≥ r1 − (r1 − r2)x1 − (r2 − r3)x2 − r3x3.
For x2 > x3, the three-step inequality dominates the two-step inequality (3.13)
of Example 3.3.2.
To facilitate discussion of the step inequality and its properties, we












θω ≥ rωc (1 − x′c), c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
x′c ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD.










xc ≥ b (3.14a)
θω ≥ rωc xc, c ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (3.14b)
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ AD. (3.14c)
Let BiSNI′ denote the feasible region of BiSNIP′.
Definition 3.3.5. For ω ∈ Ω, an ordered subset T (ω) is defined as
T (ω) = {c1, c2, · · · , clω} ⊆ ADω




> · · · > rωclω > 0, (3.15)





Definition 3.3.6. Let rω be a valid lower bound for θω. For a given T (ω),
define step size dωci as
dωci =
{
rωci − rωci+1 if i = 1, · · · , lω − 1
rωci − rω if i = lω.
Note that lω depends on ω, but when possible we suppress this for




dωc xc + r
ω. (3.16)
Lemma 3.3.7. Let T (ω) satisfy Definition 3.3.5 and dωci satisfy Definition 3.3.6.
Step inequality (3.16) is valid for BiSNI′.
Proof. Let (x, θ) ∈ BiSNI′, and S = {c ∈ AD : xc = 1}. If S = ∅ then
θω ≥ rω,




1 ≤ i ≤ lω








ω ≤ rωcj∗ ≤ r̂ω ≤ θω.
Thus, the step inequality is valid for BiSNI′.
With the step inequality being valid for BiSNIP′, we seek conditions
under which the step inequality defines a facet. For notational simplicity, we
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discuss facet properties of a step inequality for an arbitrary scenario ω̂, and
hence the results can hold all scenarios.








θω̂ ≥ rω̂c xc, c ∈ ADω̂
xc ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ ADω̂.
Let L(b) = {c ∈ ADω̂ : rω̂c ≤ zω̂(b)} and U = AD \ ADω̂. We consider
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases in which we pose additional
conditions:
Case 1: ADω̂ = AD.
Case 2: ADω̂ = AD, and |U | ≥ b.
Case 3: ADω̂ = AD, and |U | < b.






Since BiSNIP′ becomes trivial if b = 0 or b = |AD| and becomes infeasible if
b > |AD|, we assume 0 < b < |AD|.
Lemma 3.3.8. Let ω̂ ∈ Ω, and suppose ADω̂ = AD. The step inequality
(3.17) with ω = ω̂ is facet-defining for conv(BiSNI′) if
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1. 0 < b < |AD|,
2. L(b) ∩ T (ω̂) = ∅, and
3. rω̂ = zω̂(b).
Proof. To prove that (3.17) is a facet, it suffices to show that there are |AD|+
|Ω| affinely independent feasible points in BiSNI′ and that (3.17) holds with





{0, 1}|AD| × R|Ω|+ . Let ei be the (|AD| + |Ω|)-unit vector with a “1” in the
position of element i and zero elsewhere (e.g., for c ∈ AD, ec has a “1” in
the position of xc). With r̄ω = max
c∈ADω








ec + zω̂(b)eω̂, (3.18a)













r̄ωeω + rω̂cleω̂ +
∑
c∈L(b)\{ci}



























k ∈ AD \ (T (ω̂) ∪ L(b)), (3.18e)
where j(k) ∈ argmax
ci ∈ T (ω̂)
{i : rω̂ci ≥ rω̂ck}. It is clear that there are at least |L(b)|
components of x that are one at each point above. Since |L(b)| ≥ b, the
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cardinality constraint (3.14a) is satisfied for each point of (3.18). Since θω is
set to r̄ω or r̄ω + 1, ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂}, constraints (3.14b) are satisfied at points
of (3.18) for ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂}. Points of (3.18a) and (3.18b) have xc = 0 for
c ∈ AD \ L(b), xc = 1 for c ∈ L(b), and θω̂ = zω̂(b). Hence, these points
satisfy constraint (3.14b) for scenario ω̂. Thus, points in (3.18a) and (3.18b)
are feasible in BiSNIP′. For these points, θω̂ = zω̂(b) and so (3.17) holds with
equality at (3.18a) and (3.18b). In aci of (3.18c), xc = 1 only if c ∈ L(b)∪{cl}.
Since dω̂cl = r
ω̂
cl
− zω̂(b) and θω̂ = rω̂cl in (3.18c), constraint (3.14b) is satisfied




1 c ∈ {cj, · · · , cl}
1 c ∈ L(b)
0 otherwise
.








ω̂(b) = rω̂cj .
Since θω̂ = rω̂cj in (3.18d), we satisfy constraint (3.14b) and have (3.17) with




1 c ∈ {cj(k), · · · , cl}
1 c = ck
1 c ∈ L(b)
0 otherwise
.
Since rω̂j(k) ≥ rω̂k and θω̂ = rω̂j(k), points of (3.18e) are feasible and (3.17) holds
with equality. Therefore, points of (3.18) are feasible in BiSNI′, and the step
inequality (3.17) holds with equality at each point.
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Let âω̂ = aω̂ − a1 for ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂} and âc = ac − a1 for c ∈ ∪AD. Then,
âω = eω, ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂},
âi = rω̂cleω̂ + ecl − ei, i ∈ L(b),
âcj = rω̂cjeω̂ +
∑
j≤i≤l
eci , cj ∈ T (ω̂)
âk = rω̂cj(k)eω̂ + ek +
∑
j(k)≤i≤l
eci , k ∈ AD \ (T (ω̂) ∪ L(b)).
(3.19)
The following points are formed via linear combinations of points in (3.19)
āω = âω, ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂},
āi = âi − âcl
= −ei, i ∈ L(b),
ācj = âcj − âcj+1
= (rω̂cj − rω̂cj+1)eω̂ + ecj , cj ∈ T (ω̂)
āk = âk − âj(k)
= ek, k ∈ AD \ (T (ω̂) ∪ L(b)).
(3.20)
In (3.20), each point has a nonzero component which is zero in all other
points, so these points are linearly independent, and hence the points of (3.18)
are affinely independent. Therefore, step inequality (3.17) defines a facet for
conv(BiSNI′).
The next two lemmas are for Cases 2 and 3. We only list the ||AD| +
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|Ω| affinely independent feasible points and omit the proofs since they are
essentially the same as in the proof of Lemma 3.3.8.
Lemma 3.3.9. Let ω̂ ∈ Ω. Suppose ADω̂ = AD and |U | ≥ b. The step
inequality (3.17) with ω = ω̂ is facet-defining for conv(BiSNI′) if
1. 0 < b < |AD|,
2. rω̂ = 0.
Proof. With U = AD \ ADω̂ and |U | ≥ b, we specify the following |AD| + |Ω|


















































k ∈ ADω̂ \ T (ω̂),
(3.21)
where j(k) ∈ argmax
ci ∈ T (ω̂)
{i : rω̂ci ≥ rω̂k }.
Lemma 3.3.10. Let ω̂ ∈ Ω. Suppose ADω̂ = AD and |U | < b. The step
inequality (3.17) is facet-defining for conv(BiSNI′) if
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1. 0 < b < |AD|,
2. L(b − |U |) ∩ T (ω̂) = ∅, and
3. rω̂ = zω̂(b − |U |).
Proof. With U = AD \ ADω̂ and |U | < b, dω̂cl = rω̂cl − zω̂(b − |U |). We specify























ec + rω̂cleω̂ + ecl ,



























k ∈ ADω̂ \ (T (ω̂) ∪ L(b − δ)),
(3.22)
where j(k) ∈ argmax
ci ∈ T (ω̂)
{i : rω̂ci ≥ rω̂k }.
In the above lemmas, assumptions are made to keep (3.14) as a feasible
and nontrivial optimization problem. Here, we conclude the facet property of
step inequality (3.17) in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.11. For 0 < b < |AD|, if step inequality (3.17) is facet-defining
for conv(BiSNI′) if
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1. 0 < b < |AD|,
2. L(b − |U |) ∩ T (ω̂) = ∅, and
3. rω̂ = zω̂(b − |U |).
where U = AD \ ADω̂.




ω |−1 possible facet-defining step
inequalities. Adding all possible step inequalities will increase the size of
BiSNIP′ dramatically. So, we instead iteratively solve the LP relaxation of
BiSNIP′ and add step inequalities on an as-needed basis. Let (xLP , θLP ) be a
feasible solution for the LP relaxation of BiSNIP′. Our separation problem is
to search for a step inequality which is most violated at (xLP , θLP ) for each
scenario. For ω ∈ Ω, without loss of generality, assume that we already have
the following order
rωc1 ≥ rωc2 ≥ · · · ≥ rωc|ADω | > 0.







s.t. T (ω) satisfies Definition 3.3.5.
(3.23)
In scenario ω, we construct a network G(V, E) in which V = {c1, · · · , c|ADω |+1}





























Figure 3.2: The graph shows a network which is constructed according to rωci in
constraints (3.14b) for scenario ω. Node |ADω| + 1 is for rω, which is zero in this
graph.
pair, there is a node ci, and node c|ADω |+1 is for rω. There is a directed arc
from node ci to cj if rωci ≤ rωcj (See Figure 3.2). Arc length αij is defined as
αi,j =
{
(rωcj − rωci)xLPcj if rωci ≤ rωcj




for ci, cj ∈ ADω, and αi,|ADω |+1 = (rωci−rω)xLPci , for ci ∈ ADω. Since T (ω) ∈ V ,
an optimal solution T (ω) in (3.23) is the set nodes on a longest path from node






















Since G(V, E) is an acyclic directed network, we can use dynamic programming
techniques to solve (3.24). Every node on an optimal path represents a step
in an optimal ordered set T (ω) of (3.23).
Example 3.3.4. Assume that we have only one scenario in BiSNIP′ with
|AD| = 5 and












xi ∈ {0, 1} i = 1, · · · , 5.
The optimal solution of the LP relaxation is
(xLP∗, θLP∗) = (0.06280, 0.07064, 0.11302, 0.18838, 0.56515, 0.05615).
The separation problem is to find the longest path from node 6 to node 1 in a
directed acyclic network. We can visualize the directed network in Figure 3.2.
Node 6 has the value of 0, which is r, and node i has value ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. The
length of arc (i, j) is (rj − ri)xLP∗j if j < i. For instance, there is no arc (1, 5)
since r5 < r1, and α5,2 is (0.8 − 0.1)0.07064 = 0.049448 for arc (5, 2). A path
6 → 5 → 2 → 1 represents the step inequality
θ ≥ r5x5 + (r2 − r5)x2 + (r1 − r2)x1.
After we solve the longest path problem from node 6 to node 1, we generate
the most violated step inequality






3.0 5.0 8.0 9.00
…
Figure 3.3: The graph shows the separation problem is equivalent to the longest
path problem of an acyclic network.
which cuts off the optimal solution (xLP∗, θLP∗).
We solve (3.24) for each scenario and iteratively generate step inequal-
ities to tighten the BiSNIP′.
Algorithm 3.3.2. Algorithm for Tightening BiSNIP′
Step 1 Solve the LP relaxation of BiSNIP′ and obtain (xLP∗, θLP∗).
Step 2 For each scenario, solve (3.24) to generate the most violated step in-
equality, or determine that none exist.
Step 3 If there are step inequalities violated at (xLP∗, θLP∗), then add those
step inequalities to BiSNIP′ and goto Step 1. Otherwise, stop.
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As the result of Algorithm 3.3.2, we generate all necessary step inequal-
ities to tighten the formulation of BiSNIP′.
Example 3.3.5 (Example 3.3.4 continued). We add inequality (3.25) to
the original problem and solve the LP relaxation again. The new optimal
solution is (xLP∗, θLP∗) = (0.11111, 0, 0, 0, 0.88889, 0.1). Apply Algorithm 3.3.2
and add a new step inequality
θ ≥ (0.9 − 0.1)x1 + 0.1x2
to the formulation. Resolving the problem again, we obtain
(x2, θ) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0.1)
which is also a feasible solution to the original mixed-integer linear program,
and there are no additional violated step inequalities. In this example, as the
result of Algorithm 3.3.2, we obtain an integer optimal solution.
3.4 Computational Results
We use the same computational case as in Section 3.3.2. We apply Al-
gorithm 3.3.2 to add step inequalities prior to applying the branch-and-bound
algorithm, and then there are no additional inequalities generated during
the branch-and-bound algorithm. Our separation procedure is implemented
in C++ and the LPs and the mixed-integer linear programs are solved via
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Basic Formulation Tightened Formulation
b rel. gap. (%) comp. time rel. gap. (%) comp. time no. of ≥ iters.
10 15.6 19 0.00 12 732 8
20 21.8 319 0.17 15 859 9
30 23.7 660 0 8 619 6
40 23.9 539 0.06 14 651 7
50 23.8 697 0 12 570 8
60 26.0 2133 0.03 41 1401 19
70 29.0 6310 0.71 63 1353 18
80 30.5 19629 0.24 63 1156 16
90 31.3 6977 0.06 36 1034 14
100 31.2 2628 0.26 34 808 8
110 30.6 682 0.55 34 739 9
120 28.2 280 0.41 23 558 7
Table 3.2: The table shows the computational effort (in elapsed seconds)
required to solve some representative instances of BiSNIP(b) and tightened
BiSNIP(b) with step inequalities under different values of the budget b.
CPLEX version 9.0. All mixed-integer programs are solved with relative tol-
erance level 0.1%. Table 3.2 displays the computational results for: (i) solving
our basic MIP formulation directly using CPLEX’s branch-and-bound code
and (ii) adding violated step inequalities to the initial linear programming
relaxation and then proceeding with CPLEX’s branch-and-bound code. We
added step inequalities until the maximum violation was less than 10−6. In
the table, “rel. gap (%)” is 100 · (zIP − zLP )/zIP , “comp. time” reports total
computation time in seconds, “no. of ≥” reports number of step inequalities
generated and “iters.” reports the total number of major iterations. The
results suggest that step inequalities can significantly reduce required compu-
tational effort, particularly on the most challenging instances.
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Chapter 4
Solution Methods For SNIP
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 discussed properties of BiSNIP, the special case in which our
stochastic network interdiction model is on a bipartite network, and developed
associated solution methods. This chapter discusses the properties of SNIP on
a general network and develops associated solution methods.
Section 4.2 simplifies and preprocesses the basic SNIP formulation. In
Section 4.3, we discuss the L-shaped method for SNIP and two techniques
to enhance the performance of the L-shaped method. Section 4.4 extends our
development of step inequalities from bipartite networks (Section 3.3) to SNIP
on a general network. We provide computational experience in Section 4.5 and
prove a number of our results in Section 4.6.
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4.2 Tightening the Formulation











πωi − pijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
πωi − pijπωj + xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.1a)
πωi − qijπωj + (1 − xij) ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.1b)
πtω ≥ 1, ω ∈ Ω,
xij ∈ {0, 1} (i, j) ∈ AD
where ADω ⊆ AD is the set of interdictable arcs for scenario ω. We can
tighten constraints (4.1a) and (4.1b) by reducing the coefficients of x.
Theorem 4.2.1. Assume that 0 ≤ πωi ≤ 1, i ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω. Then, the con-
straints
πωi − pijπωj + (pij − qij)πωj xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.2a)
πωi − qijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.2b)
are valid for (4.1) and are stronger than (4.1a) and (4.1b), respectively.
Proof. For ω ∈ Ω and (i, j) ∈ ADω, if xij = 0, constraint (4.2a) is the same as
(4.1a), and constraint (4.2b) is vacuous since pij > qij and πωj ≥ 0. If xij = 1,
πωi − pijπωj + (pij − qij)πωj xij = πωi − qijπωj ,
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and (4.2a), (4.2b), and (4.1b) become the same inequality. Thus, (4.2a) and
(4.2b) are valid inequalities for (4.1).
With 0 ≤ πωj ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ qij ≤ pij ≤ 1, we have (pij − qij)πωj ≤ 1. So,
πωi − pijπωj + xij ≥ πωi − pijπωj + (pij − qij)πωj xij,
and (4.2a) is stronger than (4.1a). Since 1 − xij ≥ 0, we have
πωi − qijπωj + (1 − xij) ≥ πωi − qijπωj ,
and (4.2b) is stronger than (4.1b).
The assumption πωi ≥ 0 is satisfied for all feasible solutions, and as-
sumption πωi ≤ 1 is satisfied at any optimal solution. Inequality (4.2a) is
nonlinear because of the product πωj xij. We can replace π
ω
j with an upper
bound and (4.2a) will remain valid. Setting xij = 0, (i, j) ∈ AD, we can
compute π̂ωj , which is the optimal value of a maximum-reliability path from
node j to node tω in the uninterdicted network.
Corollary 4.2.2. Constraints
πωi − pijπωj + (pij − qij)π̂ωj xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
πωi − qijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
are valid for (4.1) and stronger than (4.1a) and (4.1b), respectively.
In what follows, we simply substitute 1 for π̂ωj , j ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω.
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Corollary 4.2.3. Constraints
πωi − pijπωj + (pij − qij)xij ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
πωi − qijπωj ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω
are valid for (4.1) and stronger than (4.1a) and (4.1b), respectively.









aijxij ≤ b (4.3a)
πωi − pijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ A \ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.3b)
πωi − pijπωj + (pij − qij)xij ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.3c)
πωi − qijπωj ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ ADω, ω ∈ Ω (4.3d)
πtω ≥ 1, ω ∈ Ω, (4.3e)
xij ∈ {0, 1} (i, j) ∈ AD,
and we will develop solution techniques for (4.3).
4.3 L-Shaped Method
4.3.1 Multi-cut L-shaped method
We first form the master program and the subproblem for the L-shaped
method. Separating the second-stage problem for each scenario from the de-
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terministic equivalent formulation (4.3), we have
h(x, (sω, tω)) = min
π
πsω
πi − pijπj ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ A \ ADω
πi − pijπj + (pij − qij)xij ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ ADω
πi − qijπj ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ ADω
πtω ≥ 1.
(4.4)
The dual of (4.4) is




















(pjtωyjtω + qjtωzjtω) = 0.
(4.5)










θω ≥ h(x, (sω, tω)), ω ∈ Ω
xij ∈ {0, 1}, (i, j) ∈ AD.
(4.6)
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aijxij ≤ b (4.7a)




(pij − qij)yω,kij xij

 ,
ω ∈ Ω, k ∈ Kω (4.7b)
xij ∈ {0, 1} (i, j) ∈ AD,
where set Kω is the index set of extreme points of the feasible region in (4.5).
If Kω indexes all the extreme points of (4.5)’s feasible region then (4.7) is
called the full master and z = z∗. If Kω is only a subset of these extreme
points then (4.7) is called the relaxed master and z ≤ z∗. We call (4.7) and
(4.5) the master program and subproblem, respectively. Each extreme point of
(4.5)’s feasible region is a simple path connecting sω and tω. In an optimality
cut in (4.7b), yktω is the evasion probability of the kth path from s
ω to tω, and
yω,kij > 0 if arc (i, j) is on the kth evasion path and is not interdicted. Here,
ADωk = {(i, j) ∈ AD : yω,kij > 0} denotes the set of uninterdicted interdictable
arcs on the kth path in scenario ω. The size of full master program can be
very large because the number of possible paths for a given network is typically
enormous. In the L-shaped method, we iteratively add optimality cuts with
the goal of obtaining an optimal solution of the original problem by solving a
relaxed master program, which contains a subset of optimality cuts. Next, we
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state the multi-cut L-shaped algorithm for SNIP.
Algorithm 4.3.1. Multi-cut L-shaped Algorithm for SNIP
Step 0: Define a tolerance ε > 0. Set k = 1, z̄ = 1, and z = 0. Initialize
constraints (4.7b) with θω ≥ 0.
Step 1: Solve kth relaxed master program (4.7). Obtain optimal objective
value z and optimal solution (xk, θk).
Step 2: For each scenario ω ∈ Ω, solve subproblem (4.5) with xk, and ob-
tain the optimal objective value h(xk, (sω, tω)) and an optimal solution
yω,k. Let ẑ =
∑
ω∈Ω
pωh(xk, (sω, tω)). If z̄ ≥ ẑ, then update the incumbent
solution z̄ = ẑ and x∗ = xk.
Step 3: If z̄ − z ≤ min (|z̄|, |z|)ε, then stop: x∗ is a solution with objective
function value within (100ε)% of optimum.
Step 4: Append the set of optimality cuts
θω ≥ yktω −
∑
(i,j)∈ADωk
(pij − qij)yω,kij xij, ω ∈ Ω
to master program (4.7). Set k = k + 1 and goto Step 1.
Each iteration includes solving a master program and a subproblem
for each ω ∈ Ω. The solution of the relaxed master program is a feasible
interdiction plan, and the solution of the subproblem is an evasion path, which
is the evader’s response to the interdiction plan.
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Theorem 4.3.1. Algorithm 4.3.1 terminates in Step 3 at a solution x∗ with
objective values ẑ within (100ε)% of z∗ in a finite number of steps.
Proof. The proof follows the standard argument (e.g., [58] by Van Slyke and
Wets) noting that SNIP has a finite optimal solution and relatively complete
recourse.
4.3.2 Enhanced L-shaped Method
In this section, we introduce two techniques to improve the performance
of Algorithm 4.3.1. During each iteration, we generate additional valid cuts
for each scenario to improve the approximation of h(x, (sω, tω)), and we fix
some components of x to solve the master problem (4.7) heuristically.
At each iteration, we generate |Ω| optimality cuts, but only one cut
for each scenario. These cuts form an outer approximation of the recourse
function. To generate an optimality cut, we need to solve a master program
and a subproblem. The subproblem is a maximum-reliability path problem
and can be solved polynomially. But, the master program is a mixed-integer
linear program and the computational time can be large. So, it may be better
to generate more than one optimality cut for each scenario at each iteration.
At the kth iteration, we solve the subproblem and obtain the optimality
cut,
θω ≥ yktω −
∑
(i,j)∈ADωk
(pij − qij)yω,kij xij, (4.8)
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which is an evasion path in scenario ω. If this evasion path is interdicted,
what is the next optimal evasion path? In Algorithm 4.3.1, we won’t answer
this question unless we solve another master program. Thus, it may be helpful
to generate some additional evasion paths assuming that the current evasion
path is interdicted. With ADωk being the set of interdictable arcs on the kth
path in scenario ω, we set xij = 1 one at a time for each (i, j) ∈ ADωk and
resolve the subproblem for scenario ω to generate additional evasion paths.
We can then add up to |ADωk | additional optimality cuts for each scenario. In
this way, we aim to reduce the number of iterations in the L-shaped method.
For a given b, the space of feasible interdiction plans can be very large.





diction plans. When b is large, it may take many iterations for the L-shaped
method to converge. Here, we describe a heuristic method which decreases
the computational effort by solving the master program at some iterations by
fixing a subset of the binary variables to 1. At the kth iteration, we solve
the master program and obtain an optimal solution (xk, θk). Solving the sub-
problem, we generate an optimality cut with the evasion probability yktω for
each ω ∈ Ω. In the next algorithm, we describe a technique to fix a subset of
components of x to 1 for iteration k + 1.
Algorithm 4.3.2. Algorithm for Fixing Variables
Step 0: Input: the master program solution (xk, θk), the subproblem solution
yktω , ω ∈ Ω. Set δ > 0.
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Step 1: Fix variable xij at 1 if xkij = 1.
Step 2: For (i, j) ∈ AD with xij = 1, if there exists ω ∈ Ω and l ∈ {1, · · · , k}
such that (i, j) ∈ ADωl and yltω ≤ δyktω , free variable xij.
In Algorithm 4.3.2, we separate optimality cuts into one group with
large evasion probabilities and one group with small evasion probabilities for
each scenario. As the number of iterations increases, we are more likely to fix
xij to 1 if (i, j) is on a path with large evasion probabilities and to search for
the rest of interdiction plan in the group with small evasion probabilities. By
fixing some components of x, we can keep xk+1 from moving too far away from
xk and this may help to eliminate the well-known “bang–bang” effect, which
can slow convergence of the L-shaped method.
Note z is not a valid lower bound on z∗ if some x’s are fixed in this
manner. Thus, we can only terminate in Step 3 in Algorithm 4.3.1 when we
free all components of x and solve the unrestricted master program.
Algorithm 4.3.3. Enhanced Multi-cut L-shaped Algorithm for SNIP
Step 0: Define a tolerance ε > 0. Set k = 1, z̄ = 1, and z = 0. Initialize
constraints (4.7b) with θω ≥ 0.
Step 1: Solve kth relaxed master program (4.7). Obtain the optimal objective
value z and an optimal solution (xk, θk).
Step 2: For each scenario ω ∈ Ω, solve subproblem (4.5) with xk, and ob-
tain the optimal objective value ẑ(xk, (sω, tω)) and an optimal solution
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yω,k. Let ẑ =
∑
ω∈Ω
pωh(xk, (sω, tω)). If z̄ ≥ ẑ, then update the incumbent
solution z̄ = ẑ and x∗ = xk.
Step 2.1: Apply Algorithm 4.3.2 to fix components of x.
Step 3: If z̄ − z ≤ min (|z̄|, |z|)ε and the unrestricted master program was
solved, then stop: x∗ is a solution with objective function value within
(100ε)% of optimum. If z̄ − z ≤ min (|z̄|, |z|)ε and the master program
was solved with some variables fixed, free all components of x and go to
Step 4.
Step 4: Append the set of optimality cuts
θω ≥ yktω −
∑
(i,j)∈ADωk
(pij − qij)yω,kij xij
to master problem (4.7) for each scenario ω ∈ Ω.
Step 5: For each (i, j) ∈ ADωk , set x̂k = xk and x̂kij = 1, and solve subproblem
h(x̂k, (sω, tω)) and add the optimality cut to (4.7). Repeat the process for
each scenario. Set k = k + 1 and goto Step 1.
4.4 Step Inequality
The master problem (4.7) is a mixed-integer linear program, and the
bulk of the computational effort in solving SNIP via the L-shaped method is
in solving (4.7). In Section 3.3, we introduced step inequalities to tighten the
LP relaxation formulation of BiSNIP, and we illustrated the benefit of these
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facet-defining inequalities in reducing computational time. In this section, we
extend the notion of step inequalities to SNIP.
In the master problem, there is a budget constraint (4.7a) and a set of
optimality cuts (4.7b). Each optimality cut
θω ≥ yktω −
∑
(i,j)∈ADωk
(pij − qij)yω,kij xij
contains an evasion path, where yktω is the overall evasion probability and if
yω,kij > 0 then arc (i, j) is on this optimal path. Let
T ω = {l1, l2, · · · , lL} ⊆ Kω
be an ordered index set with
yl1tω > y
l2
tω > · · · > ylLtω ,
and yl1tω = max
i∈Kω
yitω . The intuition behind the step inequality for SNIP is that
a smuggler chooses a path with the largest evasion probability unless the path
is interdicted, then the smuggler chooses the second best path and so on. We
have two types of step inequalities in different algebraic forms. The Type-I
step inequality is defined as
θω ≥ yl1tω −
∑
li∈T ω




where ylL+1tω = 0.
Theorem 4.4.1. The Type-I step inequality (4.9) is valid for master program
(4.7).
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Proof. Let (x̂, θ̂) be a feasible solution of (4.7). For ω ∈ Ω, let W ω = {k :
yktω > θ̂




(ylitω − yli+1tω )(
∑
(i,j)∈ADωli
x̂ij) = yl1tω −
∑
li∈W ω∩T ω























where the last inequality holds since θ̂ω ≥ yktω for k ∈ T ω \ W ω and the
telescoping terms in (4.10a) collapse to such a yktω (or to zero if W
ω = T ω).
Thus, the Type-I step inequality is valid for (4.7).
In the last theorem, we showed that the Type-I step inequality is valid
(4.7) , which includes the full master program if Kω denotes all extreme points
of (4.5), ω ∈ Ω. Next, we provide an example for the Type-I step inequality.
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θ ≥ 0.9 − 0.9x1 − 0.9x2
θ ≥ 0.8 − 0.9x2 − 0.8x3
θ ≥ 0.7 − 0.8x1 − 0.7x4
θ ≥ 0.6 − 0.6x5 − 0.7x6
θ ≥ 0.5 − 0.5x7 − 0.6x8
θ ≥ 0
xi ∈ {0, 1} i = 1, · · · , 8.
We assume that θ ≥ 0 since the evasion probability of any path is nonnega-
tive. Let K = {k1, k2, k3, k4, k5}, index of the five respective optimality cuts,
T = {l1 = k1, l2 = k3, l3 = k5}, and AD = {1, · · · , 8}. Then, Type-I step
inequality defined on T is
θ ≥ 0.9− (0.9−0.7)(x1 +x2)− (0.7−0.5)(x1 +x4)− (0.5−0)(x7 +x8). (4.11)
We construct a set of nine feasible points, a1, · · · , a9, of the form (x, θ) as
follows
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9
x1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
x2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
x3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
x4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
x5 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
x6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
x7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
x8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
θ 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.9 0 0
These nine points are feasible and affinely independent. The Type-I step
inequality (4.11) holds with equality at each of the nine points. The dimension
of the feasible region of the above optimization problem is 9. Therefore, (4.11)
defines a facet for the convex hull of the feasible region. Because there are two
x components in each “step”, the step size between steps can be doubled. If
x1 = 1, x2 = 1 and all other x components are zero, in (4.11) we have θ ≥ 0.3
instead of θ ≥ 0.5.
The general proof of the facet property for the Type-I step inequality
consists of wearisome notation and an enumeration of affinely independent
points. We defer the proof to the appendix at the end of this chapter.
We define the Type-II step inequality for SNIP on T ω as
θω ≥ yl1tω − (yl1tω − yl2tω)vωl1 − (yl2tω − yl3tω)vωl2 − · · · − (ylLtω − 0)vωlL , (4.12)
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0 ≤ vωlk ≤ 1. (4.13b)
If xij = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ ADωlk then constraints (4.13) force vωlk = 0. If xij = 1
for some (i, j) ∈ ADωlk then vωlk may take a positive value and θω may become
less than ylktω . In the kth iteration, there are at most k new variables for each
scenario and |Ω| × k new variables in total. We don’t add variable vωlk and the
associated constraint (4.13) to (4.7) unless we add a Type-II step inequality
where vωlk is in.
Theorem 4.4.2. The Type-II step inequality (4.12)-(4.13) is valid for master
program (4.7).
Proof. Let (x̂, θ̂) be a feasible solution of (4.7). For ω ∈ Ω, let W ω = {k :
yktω > θ̂
ω}. For k ∈ W ω, ∃(i, j) ∈ ADωk such that x̂ij = 1. So, vωk = 1 satisfies




(ylitω − yli+1tω )vωli = yl1tω −
∑
li∈W ω∩T ω












(ylitω − yli+1tω )vωli
≤ θ̂ω,
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where the last inequality holds since θ̂ω ≥ yktω for k ∈ T ω \ W ω and the
telescoping terms in (4.14a) collapse to such a yktω (or to zero if W
ω = T ω).
Thus, the Type-II step inequality is valid for SNIP.
Before we proceed to further discussions on step inequalities. We use
the following example to illustrate the difference between the two types of step
inequalities.
Example 4.4.2 (Example 4.4.1 continued). The Type-II step inequality
defined on T is
θ ≥ 0.9 − (0.9 − 0.7)vl1 − (0.7 − 0.5)vl2 − (0.5 − 0)vl3 , (4.15)
with additional constraints
vl1 ≤ x1 + x2, 0 ≤ vl1 ≤ 1;
vl2 ≤ x1 + x4, 0 ≤ vl2 ≤ 1;
vl3 ≤ x7 + x8, 0 ≤ vl3 ≤ 1.
With x1 = 1 and x2 = 1, we have v1 = 1 and v2 = 1. Then in the (4.15),
θ ≥ 0.5 while θ ≥ 0.3 with the Type-I step inequality in Example 4.4.1. In this
sense, the Type-II step inequality is tighter than the Type-I step inequality.
The formal proof of the facet property for the Type-II step inequality
is also in the appendix at the end of this chapter. In our computation, we
will only implement the Type-II step inequality, and we use the term step
inequality to refer to the Type-II step inequality hereafter. We apply step in-
equalities in the course of the L-shaped method to tighten the master program
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(4.7) and reduce the computing time of solving the MIP master program. We
solve the LP relaxation of (4.7) and obtain an optimal solution (xLP , θLP ).
Let v̂ωlk = min {
∑
(i,j)∈ADωlk
xLPij , 1} . Then, we solve a separation problem to find
T ω and the associated Type-II step inequality which is most violated at the
current solution. Assume that we are at the Kth iteration and without loss of
generality, we have the following order
yl1tω ≥ yl2tω ≥ · · · ≥ ylKtω .





(ylktω − ylk+1tω )v̂ωlk , (4.16)
and this problem is similar to the separation problem of the step inequality
for BiSNIP in Section 3.3.3. We construct a network G(V, E) in which V =





directed arcs. In scenario ω, for
each optimality cut (4.7b) of (ω, li) pair, there is a node li in G(V, E), and
node lK+1 is for 0. There is a directed arc from node li to lj if ylitω ≤ yljtω . Arc
length βij is defined as
βi,j =
{
(yljtω − ylitω)v̂ωcj if ylitω ≤ y
lj
tω
0 if ylitω > y
lj
tω ,
for li, lj ∈ {l1, · · · , lK}, and βi,K+1 = ylitω v̂ωli , for li ∈ {l1, · · · , lK}. We can
identify an optimal solution of (4.16) by solving the shortest path problem
from node lK+1 to node l1 over G(V, E). The nodes on a shortest path from
node lK+1 to node l1 represent the steps in T ω on which the most violated step
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inequality may be defined. Since all arc lengths are nonnegative, this shortest
path problem can be solved polynomially.
We solve the separation problem before we apply the branch-and-bound
algorithm to the master program. We iteratively solve the LP relaxation of
(4.7) and generate step inequalities to tighten the LP relaxation of (4.7). Then,
we solve the resulting tightened master problem. We add Step 1’ before Step
1 in Algorithm 4.3.1 and Algorithm 4.3.3.
Step 1’: Solve the LP relaxation of the kth master problem (4.7). Solve the
shortest path problem and obtain an optimal solution of (4.16) for each
scenario. Repeat until there are no violated step inequalities. Then, go
to Step 1.
In the next section we investigate the benefits of enhancing Algorithm 4.3.1
with step inequalities as well as our additional valid inequality generation and
heuristic method of the master mixed-integer linear program.
4.5 Computational Results
We test our solution methods for SNIP on a general network using
a test problem of 85 facilities, 93 provinces, 320 border checkpoints, and 12
destinations. A transportation network connecting these entities includes air,
land, and water transportation modes. There are 830 nodes (85+93+320× 2
+12) and 2645 arcs in our overall network. After preprocessing, there are 456
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scenarios. We set aij = 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ AD so that the budget constraint becomes
a cardinality constraint.
We consider four variants of this problem. In the first denoted SNIP1,
pijs are independent and UNIFORM(0.5,1) (uniformly distributed between 0.5
and 1), for (i, j) ∈ A \ AD; pijs are independent and UNIFORM(0.3,0.6) and
qijs are independent and UNIFORM(0.1,0.3) for (i, j) ∈ AD. In the second
variant of the test problem, denoted SNIP2, pij takes on the same value as
in SNIP1 and then we set qij = 0.5pij. SNIP3 and SNIP4 are identical to
SNIP2 except that we set qij = 0.1pij and qij = 0, respectively.
We test four approaches: (1) Directly solve the deterministic equiva-
lent formulation (DEF), i.e., model (4.1), using branch-and-bound; (2) Algo-
rithm 4.3.1, i.e., the basic L-shaped method (LS); (3) Algorithm 4.3.1 with
Step 1’, i.e., the L-shaped method with the step inequality (LSSI); (4) Algo-
rithm 4.3.3 with Step 1’, i.e., the L-shaped method enhanced with both step
inequalities and additional cut-generation and heuristic techniques (LSSI+).
All four algorithms require solving mixed-integer linear programs. To do so, we
use CPLEX version 8.0 in its default mode with a relative stopping criterion
of 1%. When running the L-shaped method we also terminated with a relative
error of 1%, i.e., ε = 0.01 in Algorithms 4.3.1 and 4.3.3. The computations
are on a 2.8 GHz Dell Xeon dual-processor machine with 1GB memory. We
generate five independent instances of SNIP1 and then use these as the basis
for five instances each of SNIP2–SNIP4. For our four algorithms we compare
the average and maximal computational times in the following tables.
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DEF LS LSSI LSSI+
b t. time t. time(40–95%) t. time(9–46%) t. time(2–12%)
30 (29.0, 49.6) (12.4, 25.4) (3.9, 6.1) (1.5, 1.9)
40 (55.6, 97.5) (28.3, 40.3) (3.3, 3.9) (1.9, 2.5)
50 (60.6, 161.6) (25.5, 36.5) (3.2, 4.5) (2.1, 2.8)
60 (67.8, 88.3) (62.6, 121.9) (3.7, 4.7) (2.0, 2.8)
70 (35.4, 54.2) (24.3, 53.2) (3.4, 4.0) (2.2, 3.1)
80 (9.7, 15.3) (3.9, 4.4) (2.7, 3.3) (2.0, 2.3)
90 (5.1, 10.5) (3.2, 5.5) (2.4, 3.4) (1.9, 2.3)
Table 4.1: The table shows the average and maximal computational effort (in
elapsed minutes) required to solve five instances of SNIP1 by DEF, LS, LSSI,
and LSSI+ under different values of the budget b.
Table 4.1 contains the average and maximal computational effort over
five instances for SNIP1. In (·, ·), the first number is the average computation
time and the second number is the maximal computation time. The “t. time” is
the overall time for solving SNIP1 by each of the four methods, and “xx-xx%”
in the parentheses is the rough range for the percentage of the average overall
time spent solving the MIP master program in methods LS, LSSI and LSSI+.
The results indicate that the L-shaped method alone reduces the computa-
tion time, but our step inequalities further reduce the computational effort,
especially for solving the master program. The additional cut-generation and
heuristic methods for fixing variables also reduce the average overall compu-
tation time and MIP time, which is no more than 16 seconds for any of the
budget values.
Table 4.2 is analogous to Table 4.1, except that it reports our results
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DEF LS LSSI LSSI+
b t. time t. time(10–86%) t. time(4–33%) t. time(1–23%)
30 (29.3, 69.3) (9.0, 25.1) (2.3, 3.9) (1.4, 1.9)
40 (54.3, 98.4) (14.4, 26.8) (2.7, 4.7) (1.7, 2.2)
50 (36.4, 54.0) (11.2, 21.9) (2.2, 3.2) (1.9, 3.1)
60 (36.9, 61.0) (8.9, 15.1) (3.0, 4.4) (1.7, 2.3)
70 (11.7, 22.1) (5.2, 9.1) (3.0, 4.4) (2.2, 3.2)
80 (3.4, 6.2) (2.8, 4.5) (2.7, 4.2) (1.7, 2.2)
90 (0.8, 1.3) (1.8, 3.3) (2.6, 4.4) (1.7, 1.8)
Table 4.2: The table shows the average and maximal computational effort (in
elapsed minutes) required to solve some representative instances of SNIP2 by
LS, LSSI, and LSSI+ under different values of the budget b.
for SNIP2. LS performs better in SNIP2 than in SNIP1. LS, LSSI and LSSI+
reduce the computational time in all cases except for b = 90 in which DEF
solves quickly. The improvement due to the special purpose L-shaped method
with the step inequalities and further enhancements is significant. For exam-
ple, average computation time to solve the MIP master program is less than
one minute for LSSI and LSSI+ for all values of the budget.
Table 4.3 contains the computational results for SNIP3, where q = 0.1p.
Here, the solution times for DEF and LS are over the 10 hours in most of the
cases. LS doesn’t reduce the computational time to 10 hours or less except
for b = 30. SNIP3 is more difficult to solve than SNIP1 and SNIP2, and the
value of the special purpose L-shaped method with the step inequalities and
further enhancements is even more pronounced. In LSSI, average times for
all of the budget values are within two hours except for b = 90. Additional
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DEF LS LSSI LSSI+
b t. time t. time(96–100%) t. time(56–92%) t. time(28–74%)
30 (301.7, 437.7) (75.5, 102.0) (9.6, 17.1) (5.0,7.7)
40 (505.6, ×) (×, ×) (42.8, 82.9) (7.9, 10.7)
50 (579.7, ×) (×, ×) (54.2, 131.4) (10.1, 13.2)
60 (×, ×) (×, ×) (107.5, 287.8) (11.9, 15.9)
70 (×, ×) (×, ×) (108.1, 252.3) (10.8, 21.7)
80 (×, ×) (×, ×) (85.6, 128.3) (15.9, 20.1)
90 (×, ×) (×, ×) (189.9, 376.9) (26.2, 71.6)
Table 4.3: The table shows the average and maximal computational effort (in
elapsed minutes) required to solve five instances of SNIP3 by LS, LSSI, and
LSSI+ under different values of the budget b. × means computational time is
more than 10 hours.
cut-generation and heuristic methods of fixing variables reduce the average
computational time to under sixteen minutes except for b = 90.
In Table 4.4, we test our methods for q = 0. The computation times
of DEF and LS are similar to SNIP3. The step inequality alone reduces the
computation time but the performance is worse than in SNIP1, SNIP2 and
SNIP3. With the enhanced L-shaped method and step inequalities, the average
time of LSSI+ is within 1 hour for all of budget values.
4.6 Appendix
In this appendix, we show the facet properties for two types of step
inequalities with aij = 1 in (4.7). For aij = 1, the budget constraint (4.7a) is
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DEF LS LSSI LSSI+
b t. time t. time(97–100%) t. time(64–95%) t. time(40–85%)
30 (245.0, 352.8) (118.6, 167.0) (14.4, 19.3) (6.7, 11.4)
40 (543.0, ×) (531.1, ×) (46.8, 71.8) (14.1, 23.2)
50 (×, ×) (×, ×) (124.2, 247.8) (57.0, 131.7)
60 (×, ×) (×, ×) (185.9, 372.7) (33.7, 55.5)
70 (×, ×) (×, ×) (269.8, ×) (56.1, 141.4)
80 (×, ×) (×, ×) (206.5, 369.3) (18.0, 45.1)
90 (×, ×) (×, ×) (349.1, ×) (49.0, 103.8)
Table 4.4: The table shows the average and maximal computational effort
(in elapsed minutes) required to solve some representative instances of SNIP4
by LS, LSSI, and LSSI+ under different values of the budget b. × means
computational effort is more than 10 hours.









xij ≤ b (4.17a)
θω ≥ yktω − [
∑
(i,j)∈ADωk
(pij − qij)yω,kij xij],
ω ∈ Ω, k ∈ Kω (4.17b)
xij ∈ {0, 1} (i, j) ∈ AD,
Let conv(SNI) be the convex hull of the feasible region of (4.17). Set T ω =
{l1, · · · , lL} ⊆ Kω is an ordered index set satisfying
yl1tω > y
l2
tω > · · · > ylLtω ,
and yl1tω = max
k∈Kω
yktω . Before we proceed to prove the facet property of the step
inequality defined on T ω, we introduce the following notation and function.
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Definition 4.6.1.




2. Function s : ADωT ω → {1, · · · , L} is defined as
s(c) = argmin
1 ≤ i ≤ L
{ylitω : li ∈ T ω, c ∈ ADωli}.
Map r : T ω → ADω assigns an element c ∈ ADωli to li if s(c) = li,
li ∈ T ω.
3. For li ∈ T ω, set Si is defined as a subset of
⋃ {ADωk : k ∈ Kω, yktω > yli+1tω }
and Si satisfies
(a) |Si| ≤ b − 1,







(pc − qc)yω,kc ≤ yli+1tω , ∀k ∈ Kω \ {li} such that
yktω ≥ yli+1tω .










θ ≥ 0.9 − 0.9x1 − 0.9x2
θ ≥ 0.8 − 0.9x2 − 0.8x3
θ ≥ 0.7 − 0.8x1 − 0.7x4
θ ≥ 0.6 − 0.6x5 − 0.7x6
θ ≥ 0.5 − 0.5x7 − 0.6x8
θ ≥ 0
xi ∈ {0, 1} i = 1, · · · , 8.
We assume that θ ≥ 0 since the evasion probability of any path is nonnegative.
Let K = {k1, k2, k3, k4, k5}, index of the five respective optimality cuts, T =
{l1 = k1, l2 = k3, l3 = k5}, and AD = {1, · · · , 8}. Then,
1. Set ADT = {1, 2, 4, 7, 8} contains components of x which have positive
coefficients in those optimality cuts from T .
2. For function s, s(1) = 2 because x1 is in inequality k3, which is indexed
l2 in T . For rest of elements in ADT , s(2) = 1, s(4) = 2, s(7) = 3, and
s(8) = 3. For function r, r(l1) = 2, r(l2) = 1, and r(l3) = 7.
3. For map r, r(l1) = 2, r(l2) = 1, and r(l3) = 7. There can be other ways
to assign values to li, li ∈ T ω.
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4. For l1, S1 = {3}; for l2, S2 = {2, 5}; for l3, S3 = {1, 3, 5}.
For T ω ⊆ Kω, Type-I step inequality is defined in Section 4.4 as
θω ≥ yl1tω −
∑
li∈T ω




where ylL+1tω = 0. Let ȳtω = max
k∈Kω
yktω for ω ∈ Ω. We construct |Ω|+ |AD| points





aω = (ȳtω + 1)eω +
∑
ω′∈Ω\{ω}











eω̂ + ec +
∑
j∈Ss(c)
ej, c ∈ ADω̂T ω̂ , (4.19d)
where Ss(c) is defined according to part 3. in Definition 4.6.1. Let zω̂b be the
optimal objective value of the wait-and-see problem of (4.17) for scenario ω̂
with budget b.
Lemma 4.6.2. For a given T ω, all points in (4.19) are feasible for conv(SNI)
if there exists Si, ∀li ∈ T ω.
Proof. We prove the feasibility by showing all points satisfy the cardinality
constraint (4.17a) and optimality cuts (4.17b).
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For ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂}, θω takes value of ȳtω or ȳtω + 1 in points from (4.19).
Therefore, optimality cuts (4.17b) of all scenarios except scenario ω̂ are sat-
isfied at these points. Next, we show that optimality cuts in scenario ω̂ are
satisfied at these points. At points of a1, aω and ai, θω̂ = ȳtω̂ ≥ yktω̂ , ∀k ∈ K ω̂,
so optimality cuts are satisfied. In ac, since xc = 1, y
ls(c)
tω − yω̂,ls(c)c ≤ yls(c)+1tω .





tω , ∀k ∈ Kω \ {ls(c)}
with yktω > y
ls(c)+1
tω . Hence, optimality cuts (4.17b) are satisfied at points of ac
in scenario ω̂.
















xj = |Ss(c)| + 1 ≤ b, c ∈ ADω̂T ω̂ .
Therefore, points of (4.19) are feasible for conv(SNI).
Lemma 4.6.3. For a given T ω, Type-I inequality holds with equality at points
of (4.19) if for li ∈ T ω, if there exists Si with |Si ∩ ADωlk | = 1, 1 ≤ k < i.
Proof. For points of a1, aω and ai, xij = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ ADω̂T ω̂ , and θω = ȳtω̂ . So,
the inequality is at equality.
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Let ĉ ∈ ADω̂
T ω̂








∀k ∈ K ω̂ \ {ls(c)} with yktω̂ > y
ls(c)+1
tω̂
. In aĉ, xĉ = 1 and |Ss(ĉ) ∩ ADω̂li | = 1,
































Type-I inequality holds with equality at points of ac. Therefore, Type-I
inequality holds with equality at each point of (4.19).
Lemma 4.6.4. Points of (4.19) are affinely independent.
Proof. Let bj = aj − a1 for j ∈ (Ω \ {ω̂}) ∪ AD, then
bω = aω − a1 = eω ∀ω ∈ Ω \ {ω̂} (4.20a)
bi = ai − a1 = ei ∀i ∈ AD \ ADω̂T ω̂ (4.20b)
bc = ac − a1 = (yls(c)+1
tω̂
− ȳtω̂)eω̂ + ec +∑
j∈Ss(c)
ej ∀c ∈ ADω̂T ω̂ . (4.20c)
We use the following steps to further simplify bc,





Step 1 Let j = j + 1. If j > L, stop.
Step 2 For each c ∈ ADω̂
T ω̂










. Goto Step 1.
As the result of the above algorithm, we have
b̄c = ds(c)eω̂ + ec,
where ds(c) is a finite real number. Points of b̄c are obtained as linear combina-
tions of points from (4.20). Points of b̄c together with points of bω and bi are
linearly independent. Hence, points in (4.19) are affinely independent.
Theorem 4.6.5. For a given T ω, Type-I step inequality (4.18) is facet-
defining for conv(SNI) if for li ∈ T ω, there exists Si with |Si ∩ ADωlk | = 1,
1 ≤ k < i.
Proof. By Lemma 4.6.2, Lemma 4.6.3 and Lemma 4.6.4, step inequality (4.18)
is facet-defining for conv(SNI).
The Type-II step inequality is
θω ≥ yl1tω −
∑
li∈T ω





xc ∀k ∈ T ω
vωk ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ T ω
vωk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ T ω.
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Let SNI ′ be the feasible region of (4.17) with auxiliary variables and con-
straints.
Theorem 4.6.6. For a given T ω, Type-II step inequality (4.21) is facet-
defining for conv(SNI’) if for li ∈ T ω, there exists Si.




This dissertation has developed a class of stochastic network interdic-
tion models. In these models the interdictor installs detectors on arcs in a
network subject to a budget constraint. Then the smuggler’s random origin-
destination pair is revealed and the smuggler selects a maximum-reliability
path in the residual network. The interdictor’s goal is to minimize the relia-
bility of the smuggler’s maximum-reliability path. The work in this disserta-
tion was motivated by the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program, which is a
cooperative program between the US DOE and the Russian Federation State
Customs Committee. The SLD Program aims to minimize the risk of illicit
trafficking of nuclear material, equipment and technology.
Chapter 2 began with our basic model in which an informed evader
has full knowledge of the interdicted network and of the interdiction proba-
bilities. Then, we developed models for an uninformed smuggler and for the
case where the population of potential smugglers consists of a mixture of both
informed and uninformed types. Next, we developed a more general model
which includes these special cases and more general situations in which the in-
terdictor and evader have differing perceptions of the network parameters, i.e.,
109
the evasion probabilities on each arc. Finally, motivated by a special case in
which detectors can be placed only on the border of a single country or region,
we reduced our basic model to a stochastic network interdiction model on a
bipartite network. We showed that the basic model and more specifically, even
its special case on a bipartite network, has an NP-Complete decision problem.
We view this result as justifying our pursuit of our basic network interdiction
models as stochastic mixed-integer programs.
In Chapter 3 we focused on solution methods for the bipartite stochastic
network interdiction model. We simplified the model via preprocessing and de-
veloped a class of valid inequalities designed to tighten the linear-programming
relaxation of the mixed-integer program. We termed our valid inequalities as
step inequalities and provided mild conditions under which they are facets.
Given a solution to the linear-programming relaxation we provided an effi-
cient separation algorithm that either identifies a violated step inequality or
shows that all step inequalities are satisfied. Computational results on a test
problem derived from installing detectors at customs checkpoints in Russia
demonstrated the value of step inequalities, decreasing solution times from
hours to minutes in some cases.
Chapter 4 develops solution methods for the basic stochastic network
interdiction model defined on a general network, e.g., when we consider multi-
ple regions or countries and detectors can be installed on both the “boundary”
and “interior” of that network. We tightened the model through coefficient
reduction and other preprocessing. We then adapted the L-shaped decomposi-
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tion method to solve the model. We extended the notion of the step inequality
from bipartite networks to the model on a general network, deriving two types
of step inequalities that exploit special structures in L-shaped optimality cuts.
We formed a separation algorithm for the general network case, analogous to
that for the bipartite network. We showed that both types of step inequalities
are facets. Finally, we developed computational enhancements that gener-
ated additional optimality cuts and heuristically solved the master program.
Computational tests demonstrated the value of our special-purpose solution
methods.
The main contributions of this dissertation lie in both introducing a
new class of stochastic network interdiction models which have important real-
world applications and in developing solution methods which exploit special
structures in our basic model. Our interdiction models vary with respect to
the information known by the evader and with respect to the interdictor’s
and evader’s perceptions of key network parameters. An important part of
our special-purpose solution methods was the introduction of so-called step
inequalities, which are valid inequalities designed to tighten the linear pro-
gramming relaxation of the basic models. The step inequality is facet-defining
when we assume that the budget constraint is simply a cardinality constraint.
Many questions remain for future research topics. How can we in-
corporate changes in information perceived by the evader depending on the
interdiction plan? How can we incorporate smuggling rings in a model? What
other types of notions of risk should be incorporated? How sensitive is the
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proposed interdiction plan to inaccuracies in the network parameters? On the
algorithmic side, can the step inequality be generalized to a wider range of
problems? What type of approximations are appropriate when the problem
size becomes large due to growth in the network and growth in the number
of scenarios? Can effective heuristics be developed? Can effective solution
techniques be developed for the perception-based models? To what extent can
interdiction models play a larger role in models for homeland security?
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